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I. INTRODUCTION*
During the 1978-79 Term of the Supreme Court, sex discrimination
continued to be an area of active judicial concern, with the Court decid-
ing eight cases alleging unlawful sex discrimination. The purpose of this
note is to present the Court's holdings and its rationale in these decisions,
to analyze the significance of the decisions in view of the Court's past
rulings, and to suggest possible implications for future sex discrimination
cases.
The first section of the note presents cases confronting the issue of ac-
cess to the federal courts. In order to gain access to the courts, it must be
shown that the alleged victim of sex discrimination is the proper plaintiff
to invoke the court's jurisdiction. In addition, the court's power must in-
clude the authority to grant the relief sought. The designation of the
proper plaintiff and the availability of the remedy vary according to
whether the plaintiff's right is derived from the Constitution or from a
federal statute. Following a background of prior rulings on these ques-
tions, the three decisions of the 1978-79 Term on these threshold issues
are analyzed: Cannon v. University of Chicago,1 Great American Federal
Savings & Loan Association v. Novotny,2 and Davis v. Passman.3 Like
the decisions on the merits, these cases provide insight into the Court's
present attitude toward sex discrimination.
The second section of the note traces the development of the Court's
approach to gender classification. Emphasis is placed on what factors
must be shown to establish sex discrimination, what level of judicial scru-
tiny will be applied, what level of scrutiny will be applied in benign sex
discrimination actions, and how the Court has applied its level of scrutiny
* The student contributors are Janice M. Hamilton, Janine S. Hiller, Joyce Ann
Naumann and Barbara H. Vann.
1. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
2. 442 U.S. 366 (1979).
3. 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
SEX DISCRIMINATION CASES
to prior sex discrimination cases.
After this history and related background, the note presents and ana-
lyzes the five cases decided on their merits during the 1978-79 Term: Orr
v. Orr,'4 Parham v. Hughes,5 Caban v. Mohamed,6 Personnel Administra-
tion of Massachusetts v. Feeney,7 and Califano v. Westcott.8 In these
cases, the Court has in some instances relied on the tests applied in past
rulings; however, in other instances the Court has based its decisions on
an apparently new approach to alleged violations of the Constitutional
prohibition against sex discrimination.
II. SEX DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS UNDER FEDERAL STATUTES AND THE
CONSTITUTION: ACCESS TO THE FEDERAL COURTS
A. Introduction
An individual seeking redress in the federal courts for an alleged act of
discrimination may be able to rely upon a federal civil rights statute not
only to establish jurisdiction but also to obtain equitable relief or money
damages. Various sections of the Civil Rights Acts of 18719 and 1964,10 as
well as Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,11 were designed
to afford protection from discrimination, but they offer viable theories for
relief and recovery only if both the plaintiff and the allegedly discrimina-
tory conduct fall within the scope of the particular statute relied upon as
the basis for the suit. Thus the plaintiff must show that under the appli-
cable statute, he is the proper plaintiff to invoke the jurisdiction of the
court and that the particular relief sought is available to him, either
through the express grant of the relief in the statute or through judicial
interpretation of the intent and purpose of the statute.
The only remaining vestiges of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 that may
afford remedies to a plaintiff alleging wrongful sex discrimination are sec-
tions 198312 and 1985(c). 13 The particular requirements of each of these
4. 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
5. 441 U.S. 347 (1979).
6. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
7. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
8. 99 S. Ct. 2655 (1979).
9. Act of April 20, 1871, 17 Stat. 13.
10. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
11. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1976).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other persons within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
19801
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statutes and the interpretive problems that have been encountered in
their application to sex discrimination cases will be discussed throughout
this note where relevant to the analysis of the case law surrounding other
statutory provisions.
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 is the most comprehensive legislation en-
forcing the constitutional guarantee of personal freedom from discrimina-
tion on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.14 Its most
pervasive parts are Title VI and Title VII. Title VI prohibits racial dis-
crimination under any program or activity receiving federal financial as-
any rights, privileges, or immunities cured by the Constitution and laws, shall be lia-
ble to the person injured in an action of law, suit in equity, or other proper proceed-
ings for redress.
Section 1983 was originally enacted as § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13, the
so-called Ku Klux Klan Act, to grant federal courts jurisdiction over constitutional claims
against state officials, since there was no general federal question jurisdiction statute at the
time. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 502 n.30 (1977).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(c) (1976) provides, in pertinent part:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the
highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving . . . any person
or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and
immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the . . .
authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within
such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws . . . the party so injured or
deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages, occasioned by such injury
or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.
Section 1985 was originally enacted as part of § 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat.
13.
14. See note 10 supra. This act contains seven titles, as follows:
§ 1971 (1976)-Title I (voting rights and literacy tests);
§ 2000a (1976)-Title II (prohibits racial discrimination in public accomodations);
§ 2000b (1976)-Title III (authorizes civil actions by the U.S. Attorney General against
racial discrimination in public accomodations);
§ 2000c (1976)-Title IV (authorizes similar action against continued racial discrimination
in public education; amended by Act of June 23, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 375, to
include sex discrimination in public education);
§ 1975a (1976)-Title V (adds to the provisions governing the Civil Rights Commission
(created by the Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634));
§ 2000d (1976)-Title VI (prohibits racial discrimination in programs receiving federal
financial assistance);
§ 2000e (1976)-Title VII (prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin).
See generally 2 EMERSON, HABER, & DORSEN, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED
STATES (1967); Bickel, The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 32 COMMENTARY 33 (1964).
For a personal view of the events surrounding the drafting and proposal of this act to
Congress, see N. Schlei, Foreword to B. SCHELI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINA-
TION LAW (1976) [hereinafter cited as N. Schlei].
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sistance. 15 Title VII, as amended, prohibits discrimination by employers
subject to its provisions on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin in virtually all phases of employment practices."e In 1972
Congress enacted Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which
prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex in certain educational institu-
tions receiving federal financial assistance,17 patterned in major part upon
the non-discrimination commands of Title VII with respect to race.18
If the victim of sex discrimination is not afforded the protection of a
federal statutory scheme, such an individual may still have access to the
federal courts for redress. Such a claim may come within the fifth amend-
ment prohibition against the denial of equal protection of the laws if the
discrimination involves action by the federal government or a federal offi-
cial. 9 The plaintiff who wishes to assert such a claim must first establish
that federal jurisdiction is proper.20 If money damages are sought as com-
pensation for the allegedly unconstitutional conduct, the plaintiff's action
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976). Although the thrust of Title VI is clearly aimed at racial
discrimination, its provisions, as interpreted by the courts, assume special significance here
inasmuch as Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1976),
was modeled after Title VI. See notes 31 and 32 infra.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976), amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103. For an excellent discussion of the legislative history
of Title VII, see Miller v. International Paper Co., 408 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969). It is of some
interest that Title VII, as originally proposed, did not include sex as a prohibited basis of
discrimination. The word "sex" was added to the bill by an amendment only one day before
it was approved in the House of Representatives, purportedly by a representative whose
purpose was to sabotage its passage. See General Electric v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
See generally Note, Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1109 (1971).
17. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1976).
18. See 117 Cong. Rec. 30, 403-404, 30, 407-408 (1971) ("We are only adding the 3-letter
word 'sex' to existing law." (remarks of Sen. Bayh)); id. at 39, 251-252 (remarks of Rep.
Mink). See also McCarthy v. Burkholder, 448 F. Supp. 41 (D. Kan. 1978).
19. U.S. CONsT. amend. V provides that "[n]o person shall be... deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law .....
The due process clause has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to forbid the federal
government from denying equal protection of the laws, as the fourteenth amendment so
restricts the states. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See, e.g., Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426
U.S. 88 (1976); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). Furthermore, the significance of the
equal protection component of the due process clause has been held by the court to be the
same as that of the fourteenth amendment with respect to gender based classifications.
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). Accord, Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199
(1977); Weinberger v. Wisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
20. This is a problem because the federal courts have limited jurisdiction with regard to
subject matter. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1. See generally, Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-97
(1968).
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will survive a motion to dismiss2 only if the court determines that such a
remedy can be implied under the fifth amendment, inasmuch as no rem-
edy for money damages is expressly created within its language.
In the cases of the 1978-79 Term, the federal statutes were the basis of
the claims in Cannon v. University of Chicago22 and in Great American
Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Novotny.23 In Cannon, the plain-
tiff asserted a right to a private cause of action under Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972.24 The plaintiff in Novotny alleged a
right to money damages under 42 U.S.C. section 1985(c) in conjunction
with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.25 In Davis v. Passman,28
the plaintiff claimed a cause of action for money damages under the fifth
amendment. In order to understand these decisions fully and to assess
their impact on future litigation, the interpretive case law development
before the cases of the 1978-79 Term will also be examined in this section
of the note.
B. A Private Cause of Action Under Title IX: Cannon v. University of
Chicago
1. Introduction
The question in Cannon v. University of Chicago2 7 was whether an in-
jured party had the right to a private cause of action under Title 1X.2 1
The district court in Cannon, holding that Title IX did not provide for a
private cause of action and that no private remedy could be inferred, had
21. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
22. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
23. 442 U.S. 366 (1979).
24. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1976). See Comment, Implication of a Private Right of Ac-
tion Under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 73 Nw. U. L. REv. 772 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Implication of a Private Right] for a thorough discussion of how the
courts reach a decision on an implied right of action.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(c)(1976); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
26. 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
27. 441 U.S. 677 (1979). Cannon alleged sex discrimination through age discrimination.
The university will not accept to its medical program any applicants over 35 years old unless
they have advanced degrees. Because more women than men interrupt their educations, the
age and advanced degree requirements operate to exclude women. Id. at 680-81 n.2. See
Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979), which held that age discrimination triggers the ra-
tional basis test.
28. The text of 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1976) accompanies note 55, infra. See generally
Kroll, Title IX Sex Discrimination Regulations: Private Colleges and Academic Freedom,
13 URB. L. ANN. 107 (1977); Implication of a Private Right, supra note 24; Note, Title IX of
the Education Amendments of 1972: Issues Reach the Courts, 18 WASHBURN L.J. 310 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Title IX.].
[Vol. 14:515
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granted the respondent's motion to dismiss.29 The court of appeals af-
firmed, stating that Congress intended section 902 as the sole means of
enforcing Title IX.30 Section 902 established the procedure for the termi-
nation of federal funds to institutions that violate the act. The Supreme
Court reversed, finding that Cannon did have a private cause of action
under Title IX. 1
Title IX parallels Title VI in both languages and purpose. In order to
appreciate the Court's approach in interpreting Title IX, it is first neces-
sary to examine Title VI and those cases in which the plaintiff based his
cause of action on Title VI. Title IX, and its interpretive case law before
Cannon, is then presented.
2. Title VI
Title VI, as amended, provides that "[n]o person in the United States
shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimina-
tion under any program or activity receiving federal financial assis-
tance. '32 Congress's constitutional authority to enact Title VI is found in
both the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments.33 The emphasis on race
and the ability to reach private acts of discrimination under Title VI,
then, stem from the interpretation of the thirteenth amendment as ena-
bling Congress to "determine what are the badges and incidents of slav-
ery, and . . . [to prohibit such discrimination by] effective legislation."' 4
29. 406 F. Supp. 1257, 1259 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
30. 559 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 438 U.S. 914 (1978).
31. 441 U.S. at 689.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976). Both by its language and judicial interpretation, Title VI
affords no protection against discrimination based on sex or religion. New York City
Jaycees, Inc. v. United States Jaycees, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), rev'd on other
grounds, 512 F.2d 856 (2d Cir. 1975) (sex discrimination not actionable under Title VI);
Watkins v. Mercy Medical Center, 364 F. Supp. 799 (D. Idaho 1973), aff'd, 520 F.2d 894 (9th
Cir. 1975) (same as to religious discrimination).
Its provisions are nonetheless important since subsequent legislation, namely Title IX, 20
U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686, which covers only sex discrimination and only in the educational con-
text, has been interpreted by drawing parallels to the provisions of Title VI. This is in part
due to the legislative history of Title IX and, even more significantly, because the greatest
potential impact of Title VI was in the area of educational programs, heavily financed by
federal funds, but Title VI excluded sex-based discrimination from its prohibitions. See
United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir.), op. corrected, 380
F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967). See also Regents of Univ. of
Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 408 (1978) (Stevens, J., concurring).
33. United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966), op.
corrected, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967).
34. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968).
1980]
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The purpose of Title VI was to implement the fundamental prohibitions
of the fifth and fourteenth amendments against government support of
agencies, institutions, or programs which practice racial or ethnic
discrimination. s5
The primary authority to enforce Title VI was vested in the various
federal departments and agencies which were empowered to promulgate
rules, regulations and orders.36 Actions to rectify violations of Title VI
must originate in and proceed through the administrative process out-
lined in the appropriate regulations, with an emphasis on conciliation and
voluntary compliance.3 7 Lacking compliance, termination of funds is au-
thorized, but only after more time-consuming procedures.3 3 Judicial re-
view is authorized for those whose funds have been terminated, but only
after exhaustion of the administrative procedure.3 9
An individual adversely affected by discriminatory conduct was not ex-
pressly granted a private right of action anywhere within Title VI or any
regulations, and it was universally held that only the United States Attor-
ney General could initiate proceedings to terminate federal funds of an
offender. 40 Notwithstanding the language of the statute, the Fifth Circuit
held in Bossier Parish School Board v. Lemon41 that the provisions of
section 2000d were declarative not only of federal policy but also of case
law which existed independent of the statute. The court recognized that a
cause of action can be brought by an individual to seek equitable relief
for violations of the act, even "[iun the absence of a procedure through
which the individuals protected by section 601's [section 2000d] prohibi-
35. Gardner v. Alabama, 385 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1046 (1968).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1976). The regulations which have received the most attention
are contained in Nondiscrimination Under Programs Receiving Federal Assistance throughthe Department of Health, Education and Welfare Effectuation of Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 45 C.F.R. §§ 80.1-.13 (1977). A list of other regulations so promulgated
follows 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000d-1 (1978 & Supp. 1979).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1976). See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. §§ 80.8-.10 and 81.1-.107 (1979).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1976). See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. §§ 80.8(c), 81.121 (1979).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-3 (1976). See, e.g., Feliciano v. Romney, 363 F. Supp. 656 (S.D.N.Y.
1973); NAACP, Western Region v. Brennan, 360 F. Supp. 1006 (D.D.C. 1972). Contra,
NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 919 (D. Del. 1977); Dermott Spe-
cial School Dist. v. Gardner, 278 F. Supp. 687 (E.D. Ark. 1968).
For a criticism of this lengthy process and its consequent ineffectiveness, see Note, Sex
Discrimination-The Enforcement Provisions for Title IX of the Education Amendments
of 1972 Can Be Strengthened to Make the Title IX Regulations More Effective, 49 TEMP.
L. Q. 207 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Sex Discrimination-The Enforcement Provisions].
40. See, e.g., Green Street Ass'n v. Daley, 373 F.2d 1 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 932
(1967).
41. 370 F.2d 847 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 911 (1967).
[Vol. 14:515
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tion may assert their rights under it."'42
The theory of Lemon, then, is that section 2000d-1 is not an exclusive
remedy, and that a private cause of action may be asserted by an ag-
grieved individual. Accordingly, black and white plaintiffs have been per-
mitted to challenge alleged violations of Title VI in the areas of educa-
tion, public housing, public transportation, municipal services, and
private recreational facilities. 43 A federal district court, in Southern
Christian Leadership Conference, Inc. v. Connolly," granted the plaintiff
organization a declaratory judgment in a suit involving alleged discrimi-
nation by the Small Business Administration in its approval of certain
loans. The court stated that "[tihere is strong federal policy in favor of
judicial resolution of racial discrimination claims. . . . 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-
2 clearly evidences congressional intent to subject ... [acts of possible
racial discrimination by an agency] to close judicial scrutiny. '45 The em-
phasis by these courts makes it clear that the remedy is considered prop-
erly the subject of judicial creation rather than merely an occasion for
deferral to the legislature.4 6
The Supreme Court, in Lau v. Nichols,47 discussed Title VI and its
reach with respect to the changes it might require in a public school's
program, but did not explicitly address the legitimacy of plaintiff Lau's
42. Id. at 852. The court stated that plaintiff Lemon had asserted a "national constitu-
tional right," which deserved the protection of the federal courts. Id. at 851. The court then
cited two cases in which remedies not expressly granted by the pertinent statutes had none-
theless been implied by the courts: Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192
(1944), where a cause of action for injunctive and monetary relief was judicially created
under the Railway Labor Act of 1934, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1976); Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v.
Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916), where a cause of action for a private civil remedy was implied in
a federal regulatory statute.
With regard to the doctrine of implication, helpful articles are Note, Implying Civil Rem-
edies from Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 HA v. L. REv. 285 (1963); Note, Implied Pri-
vate Action Under Federal Statutes-The Emergence of a Conservative Doctrine Ap-
proach, 18 WM. & MARY L. REv. 429 (1976).
43. Hawkins v. Towh of Shaw, Miss., 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971) (municipal services);
Bossier Parrish School Board v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 911
(1967) (education); Nashville 1-40 Steering Comm. v. Ellington, 387 F.2d 179 (6th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 921 (1968) (public transportation); Hawthorne v. Kenbridge Recrea-
tion Ass'n, 341 F. Supp. 1382 (E.D. Va. 1972) (private recreation club); Thomas v. Housing
Auth. of Little Rock, 282 F. Supp. 575 (E.D. Ark. 1967) (public housing). Contra, NAACP v.
Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 280 (D. Del. 1978).
44. 331 F. Supp. 940 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
45. Id. at 944-45 (emphasis added).
46. See notes 99,239 and 275, infra, and accompanying text.
47. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
private right of action under Title VI.4 s Two years later, in 1976, the
Court considered another Title VI case, Hills v. Gautreaux.49 The only
issue before the Court was the propriety of the geographical scope of the
district court's remedial program,50 but the language and terms used
throughout the opinion were those of Title VI and not those of traditional
equal protection cases despite the fact that plaintiffs had also asserted a
violation of fifth amendment rights. Neither Lau nor Hills is conclusive
as to the existence of a private Title VI action; while the Court did not
preclude consideration of the merits due to its non-existence, neither did
the Court explicitly approve the plaintiffs' theory of recovery. The cases
provide only indirect support and indicate at best a "tacit approval" by
the Court.
In 1978, Regents of University of California v. Bakke51 came before the
Supreme Court. Plaintiff Bakke alleged that he had been denied admis-
sion to medical school because of racial discrimination in violation of Ti-
tle VI. In a plurality opinion, the Court held that Bakke was to be admit-
ted to medical school, but only four of the Justices were willing to imply a
private right of action under Title VI and then base their decision upon
the school program's violation of the statute.5 2 Thus, Bakke also was not
dispositive as to the implication of a private remedy under Title VI, and
the question seems to remain open, at least insofar as a majority of the
Court is concerned.
48. The interpretation of Lau is made difficult by the fact that the plaintiff also asserted
42 U.S.C. § 1983 as the basis of his claim. One commentator suggests that Lau is therefore
of little or no significance to the resolution of the issue whether a private right of action
exists under Title VI. Implication of a Private Right, supra note 24, at 779-80.
49. 425 U.S. 284 (1976). This case was the consolidation of two Seventh Circuit cases,
Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1971) and Gautreaux v. City of Chicago, 480
F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1973) which, in turn had consolidated several district court cases.
50. 425 U.S. at 292. The inter-district remedy had been ordered in Gautreaux v. Romney,
332 F. Supp. 366 (1971).
51. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
52. Id. at 408 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens was joined by Chief Justice Bur-
ger and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist. Justice Powell supplied the fifth vote for Bakke.
He based his decision on the unconstitutionality of the medical school program, assuming
"only for the purposes of this case that... [Bakke] has a right of action under Title VI."
Id. at 284.
The remaining four Justices, Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blaclanun, found that the
program did not violate the Constitution. Id. at 325-26.
Justice White, in a separate opinion, adamantly opposed the implication of a private right
of action under Title VI and interpreted Lau as a § 1983 suit, asserting that the Court had
ignored the tough jurisdictional issue in that case. Id. at 380 n. 1.
524 [Vol. 14:515
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3. Title IX
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972*1 was enacted in re-
sponse to the problem of widespread sex discrimination by educational
institutions throughout the United States, effectively denying women op-
portunities equal to those offered their male counterparts.' The com-
mand of Title IX is simply that "[n]o person in the United States shall,
on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the bene-
fits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any educational program
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance .... ,5 The language
intentionally tracks that of the Title VI prohibition against racial dis-
crimination in all federally financed programs.5 6
Congress's purpose in enacting Title IX was apparently threefold: (1)
to avoid constitutional violations on the part of the federal government
by financing programs administered in a discriminatory fashion; (2) to
effect a measure of quality control by preventing the arbitrary exclusion
of some participants who could benefit from educational programs receiv-
ing such support; and (3) to provide legal protection for women seeking
such educational opportunities. 57
The enforcement mechanism authorized by Title IX is essentially the
same as that found in Title VI. The same emphasis is placed upon concil-
iation, voluntary compliance, and administrative procedures prior to any
termination of funds.58 Also similar to Title VI is the absence of an ex-
53. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1976).
54. See Discrimination Against Women: Hearing on § 805 of H. R. 16098 Before a Spe-
cial Subcommittee of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1970). See also Bueck and Orleans, Sex Discrimination-A Bar to a Democratic Educa-
tion: Overview of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 6 CONN. L. REv. 1 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Bueck & Orleans].
55. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1976). The institutions included within the scope of this prohibi-
tion are listed at 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(2)-(a)(9) (1976). The definition of federal financial
assistance is quite broad. See 45 C.F.R. § 86.2(g) (1979); see also Note, Title IX, supra note
28, at 101-04.
56. The text of Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976) accompanies note 32 supra. See notes
18 and 32 supra, for some of the legislative history of Title IX.
57. Bueck & Orleans, supra note 54, at 12-15; 118 Cong. Rec. 5806-07 (1972) (remarks of
Sen. Bayh).
58. Compare 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976) (Title IX) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1976) (Title
VI). The regulation promulgated by HEW appears at 45 C.F.R. § 86 (1979) and incorporates
by reference the Title VI Regulations 45 C.F.R. §§ 80 and 81 (1979). See also the preamble
to the Title IX regulation, 40 Fed. Reg. 24, 128 (1975). See text accompanying notes 32
through 52 supra.
For a review of the administrative procedures under Title VI and Title IX, see Sex Dis-
crimination-The Enforcement Provisions, supra note 39.
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press grant of a private right of action to individuals who have directly
suffered from the prohibited discriminatory action, virtually excluding
them from the enforcement mechanism. 59
There is language in the section which grants federal agencies their en-
forcement powers, providing an alternative to termination of funds. The
section provides that compliance may also be effected "by any other
means authorized by law."16 0 Such language had been used effectively by
plaintiffs to bring suit under Title VI;1 and plaintiffs have sued under
Title IX using the same theory, sometimes successfully, sometimes not.62
Those courts favoring implication of a private right of action under Ti-
tle IX have reasoned that Congress's intent to provide a private remedy
can be inferred from (1) its close tracking of Title VI language, fully
aware that private suits under that act had already been judicially recog-
nized,"3 and (2) its omission of both an express denial of a private right of
action and a declaration of the administrative remedy's exclusivity.6 One
court noted that the failure to allow private suits would create a crippling
handicap to the effectiveness of the statutory prohibition. 5
Another successful argument supporting private suit is Congress's en-
actment of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976.68 The
inclusion of Title IX suits with those under other civil rights statutes, the
remedies of which are inherently private, gives rise to an inference that
59. Judicial review is expressly provided only for the institution or agency whose funding
has been threatened, and, just as in Title VI, this process is quite lengthy. See 20 U.S.C. §
1683 (1976) and 45 C.F.R. §§ 80.8-.11, 81, 86 (1979), 80.8-.10, and 81.0-.110 (1977).
60. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976) (emphasis added).
61. See notes 41 through 45 supra, and accompanying text.
62. For some decisions implying a private right of action under Title IX, see Bednar v.
Nebraska School Activities Ass'n, 531 F.2d 922 (8th Cir. 1976); McCarthy v. Burkholder,
448 F. Supp. 41 (D. Kan. 1978); Piascik v. Cleveland Museum of Art, 426 F. Supp 779 (N.D.
Ohio 1976). Contra, Cannon v. University of Chicago, 559 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1977), rev'd,
441 U.S. 677 (1979); Cape v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass'n, 424 F. Supp. 732
(E.D. Tenn. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 563 F.2d 793 (6th Cir. 1977).
63. McCarthy v. Burkholder, 448 F. Supp. 41 (D. Kan. 1978). See, e.g., notes 41 through
43 supra and cases cited therein.
64. Piascik v. Cleveland Museum of Art, 420 F. Supp. 779 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
65. Id. at 781 n.1.
66. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976). The Fees Act provides:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985,
and 1986 of this title, title IX [of the Education Amendments of 1972] ... or in any
civil action or proceeding, by or on behalf of the United States of America, to enforce,
or charging a violation of ... title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the court, in its
discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable
attorney's fee as part of its costs.
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Congress recognized, at the very least, a need for private suits to insure
the effective enforcement of Title IX's anti-discriminatory policy.6 7 One
district court found this provision of the Fees Act dispositive as to the
plaintiff's right to a private remedy under Title IX.6s
A number of private suits which have been brought against private in-
stitutions under Title IX have also been based on section 1983,69 which
requires state involvement with the private institution sufficient to estab-
lish the state action requirement.7 0
Other cases in which a private plaintiff failed to survive a motion to
dismiss a Title IX suit involved alleged violations of the HEW employ-
ment regulations promulgated to enforce Title IX's prohibition in the
area of employment practices in covered programs.7 1 Most courts have
refused to honor these regulations on the ground that HEW exceeded the
scope of its authority under Title IX, reasoning that Congress aimed the
Title IX prohibition against sex discrimination in recruitment for and ad-
mission to educational programs and not at hiring and promotion of the
faculty teaching in those programs. Furthermore, Title VII of the Civil
67. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 94-1011, at 2 (1976) which emphasizes the practical dependence
of all the statutes listed in the Fees Act upon private enforcement and the necessity of
awarding attorney's fees to facilitate private suits. Thus it is quite logical to infer that Con-
gress intended to make this award available to prevailing parties in private suits, rather
than to agencies seeking judicial review when their federal funds have been threatened.
68. McCarthy v. Burkholder, 448 F. Supp. 41 (D. Kan. 1978). Contra, Cannon v. Univer-
sity of Chicago, 559 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
69. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). See note 12 supra for statutory text.
70. For an analysis of the various types of state action, see Note, State Action: Theories
for Applying Constitutional Restrictions to Private Activity, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 656 (1974).
For an application of the state action doctrine to sex discrimination cases, see Note, Consti-
tutional Law-State Action-A Lesser Standard of State Action Is to Be Employed for
Claims Involving Sex Discrimination, 21 ViL. L. REv. 973 (1976).
Some illustrative cases wherein state involvement was found sufficient: De La Cruz v.
Tormey, 582 F.2d 45 (9th Cir. 1978); Leffel v. Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 444
F. Supp. 1117 (E.D. Wis. 1978); Bucha v. Illinois High School Ass'n, 351 F. Supp. 69 (N.D.
Ill. 1972).
Some cases where state involvement was found insufficient: Jones v. Oklahoma Secondary
School Activities Ass'n, 453 F. Supp. 150 (W.D. Okla. 1977); Cannon v. University of Chi-
cago, 406 F. Supp. 1257 (N.D. I1. 1976), aff'd, 559 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 441 U.S.
677 (1979). See generally, Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978); Annot., 37 A.L.R.
Fed. 601 (1978).
Note that the effect of not implying a private remedy under Title IX is to prohibit sex
discrimination in public institutions, but not private ones. See Note, Title IX, supra note
28, at 320 n.102.
71. 45 C.F.R. §§ 86.51-.61 (1979), promulgated pursuant to Title IX 20 U.S.C. § 1682
(1976).
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Rights Act of 1964"2 was amended concurrently with the passage of Title
IX to extend its coverage of employers to include educational institutions,
public and private.7 3
4. Cannon v. University of Chicago
In Cannon, the Court applied the four factor text enunciated in Cort v.
Ash74 to ascertain whether the plaintiff has an implied remedy under Ti-
tle IX. These four factors are:
(1) whether the statute was enacted for the benefit of a special class of
which the plaintiff is a member,
(2) whether there is any indication of legislative intent to create a private
remedy,
(3) whether implication of such a remedy is consistent with the underlying
purpose of the legislative scheme,
(4) whether implying a federal remedy is inappropriate because the sub-
ject matter involves an area basically of concern to the state.75
To determine whether the first part of the Cort test is met the language
of the statute is indicative of Congress's intent. Title DC "explicitly con-
fers a benefit" on the victims of sex discrimination. Plaintiff Cannon had
alleged that sex discrimination was the effective reason for denying her
admission to the university's medical school. Cannon was determined to
be clearly a member of the class "for whose special benefit the statute
was enacted. 76 Also, the Court found the language of Title IX to be simi-
lar to that of other statutes in which judicial interpretation had implied a
private remedy to the particular class.7 7 While the Court may be reluctant
to infer a private remedy under "statutes that create duties for the bene-
72. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976). See note 16 supra, and accompanying text.
73. Id. § 2000e-1 (1976), as amended.
See Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 438 F. Supp. 1021 (E.D. Mich. 1977). Accord,
Brunswick School Board v. Califano, 449 F. Supp. 866 (D. Me. 1978); McCarthy v. Burk-
holder, 448 F. Supp. 41 (D. Kan. 1978).
74. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). Cort v. Ash was not a civil rights case; it concerned the rights of a
private shareholder to enforce a criminal statute regulating corporate contributions. For a
study on the application of the Cort v. Ash test to civil rights litigation, see Note, Implied
Rights of Action to Enforce Civil Rights: The Case for a Sympathetic View, 87 YALE L.J.
1378 (1978).
75. 441 U.S. at 689-709.
76. Id. at 694. See note 27, supra.
77. Id. at 690. The Court compared the language of § 901 of Title IX with the language of
§ 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which has been held to imply a private right of action.
Section 5 states, "No person shall be denied the right to vote. . . ." Section 901 states, "no
person ... shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded. . . . "This language contrasts with that
in statutes enacted to protect the general public. Id. at 690 nn.10-13.
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fit of the public at large,""8 it appears willing to extend the implication
doctrine in the area of civil rights, including sex discrimination. As the
Court stated, the right to be free of discrimination is a "personal one,"
supporting an inference of a personal remedy to the individual members
of the designated class. 79
The Court went behind the statutory language to the legislative history
of Title IX to apply the second factor, whether Congress intended to cre-
ate a private remedy. To the Court, the history of Title IX revealed such
an intent.8 0 However, the Court discovered this intent through an indirect
route, by comparing Title IX with Title VI. Both the language and the
legislative history of Title IX revealed that it was patterned on Title VI.81
While neither Title VI nor Title IX expressly mentions a private remedy,
when Title IX was enacted, a private remedy had already been implied
under Title VI. 2 The Court presumed that the legislators were aware of
this judicial interpretation of Title VI when they enacted Title IX.8 3
Thus, if the legislature had wanted to deny a private remedy under Title
IX, it could have expressly done so. The Court relied on the "persistence
... of the assumption" that both Title VI and Title IX create a private
right of action, an assumption in which Congress has at least acqui-
esced. 4 While the Court's reasoning depends largely on the implication of
a private remedy under Title VI, it should again be noted that the Su-
preme Court has never expressly held that a plaintiff does indeed have a
private remedy under Title VI. The Court also found legislative intent to
create a private remedy in the inclusion of Title IX within the purview of
the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Award Act of 1976, which provides that a
court may award attorney's fees in cases under Title IX, Title VI, and
several other civil rights statutes.8 5
The third test under Court is applied by balancing the legislative en-
forcement scheme and the overall purpose of the statute. The Court
should not imply a private remedy if such a remedy would frustrate the
enforcement scheme expressly defined in the statute. However, on balanc-
ing, this legislative scheme yields to the statutory purpose. Thus, if a pri-
vate remedy, although not expressly part of the legislative scheme, will
promote the statutory purpose, the Court will be more prone to imply the
78. Id. at 692 n.13.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 694.
81. Id. at 682-85 nn.3&5; Id. at 694-95 nn.16-17.
82. Id. at 696 nn.20-21. See text accompanying notes 51-52 supra.
83. Id. at 696.
84. Id. at 703.
85. Id. at 699 & n.25. See text accompanying notes 66-68 supra.
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private cause of action. s
Again comparing Title VI and Title IX, the Court found two basic pur-
poses of the statutes in the congressional debates on the statutes: (1) to
make sure that federal funds were not used to support discrimination; (2)
to provide protection for the individual against discriminatory practices.87
The first purpose obviously can be achieved through the termination of
federal funds; however, this action would protect the individual victim of
discrimination only indirectly. A private right of action clearly would pro-
mote the second statutory purpose. In addition, the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare, the agency that administers Title IX,
supports a private remedy because it will further the purposes of the
statute.8"
The final hurdle, the fourth Cort factor, is whether an implication of a
private remedy infringes on an area of basic concern to the states. The
Court leaped this hurdle by asserting that since the Civil War, the federal
government and courts have had the primary responsibility of "protecting
citizens against . . . discrimination.""9
The Cort v. Ash test provides four factors to balance in deciding the
availability of a private remedy under a federal statute. The failure to
meet one or more of the requirements would not necessarily be fatal to
the implication of a private cause of action. In Cannon, however, no bal-
ancing was applied because all four of the factors were in the petitioner's
favor.90
Justice White wrote a dissenting opinion in Cannon, in which Justice
Blackmun joined.9' Justice White found no intent to create a private
86. Id. at 703.
87. Id. at 704 n.36.
88. Id. at 706.
89. Id. at 708.
90. Id. at 709. The Court also considered the respondent's arguments against implying a
private cause of action: (1) admission decisions of universities should not be subjected to
judicial scrutiny by disappointed applicants; (2) in other titles of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, Congress expressly provided for private actions when it found them desirable; (3) the
legislative history denies an implied private remedy. The Court answered these arguments
in the following manner: (1) this argument is a policy issue already resolved by Congress,
and a private remedy under Title VI has not- created a voluminous amount of burdensome
litigation for university administrators; (2) the creation of express remedies in one part of a"complex statutory scheme" is not sufficient alone to deny the implication of a private rem-
edy in another part; an intent to exclude is needed; (3) this argument was dispensed with in
the analysis of the legislative history. Id. at 709-16.
91. Id. at 718. Justice White was also opposed to the implication of a private cause of
action under Title VI in Bakke, 438 U.S. at 379-86.
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cause of action in the legislative history of Title VI or Title IX. In his
opinion the purposes of the statutes are to be achieved by agency ac-
tion.92 If private suits are to be brought, they would have to be brought
under section 1983, which has a color of state law requirement.93 Without
an act under color of state law, the plaintiff is not entitled to a private
remedy: "Congress did not intend to create a private remedy for discrimi-
nation practiced not under color of state law but by private parties or
institutions."94 Thus Justice White appears to see only one statutory pur-
pose to Title IX-the elimination of federal funds to institutions that
practice discrimination. Individuals can obtain redress only if the recipi-
ents of these federal funds are acting under color of state law. 5
Justice Powell also wrote a dissenting opinion, agreeing with Justice
White and advocating judicial restraint in implying private causes of ac-
tion. 8 Justice Powell would not imply a private remedy without "the
most compelling evidence of affirmative congressional intent '97 and un-
less there are no alternative remedies to enforce the statutory duty.98 Jus-
tice Powell would put the burden back on Congress to "resolve crucial
policy questions created by the legislation it enacts." 99
5. Conclusion
Through the liberal application of the Court v. Ash test in Cannon and
through the Court's dependence on Title VI to interpret Title IX, the
Court seems to have afforded freedom from sex discrimination the same
protection as freedom from race discrimination, if not under the Consti-
tution,00 at least under a federal statute. In fact, sex discrimination may
have more protection than race discrimination at this point, since the
Court has not yet by majority opinion implied a private cause of action
under Title VI. Of course, this elevation of sex discrimination protection
is limited to the area of education within the scope of Title IX.
92. 441 U.S. at 721.
93. See the text of § 1983 in note 12 supra.
94. 441 U.S. at 724.
95. Id. at 725.
96. Id. at 73-49.
97. Id. at 731.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 749.
100. See text accompanying notes 215-19, infra.
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C. Damages for Title VII Violations Under Section 1985(c): Great
American Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Novotny
1. Introduction
The plaintiff in Great American Federal Savings & Loan Association
v. Novotny °10 alleged a violation of Title VII and claimed damages under
42 U.S.C. section 1985(c). Novotny, a former officer of the defendant sav-
ings and loan association, claimed that the association had denied female
employees equal employment opportunities and that when he supported
their position, he was fired. Thus, the plaintiff alleged violations of Title
VII. In addition, Novotny claimed damages under section 1985(c), alleg-
ing a conspiracy by the directors of the corporation to deprive him of the
equal protection of, and equal privileges and immunities under, the
laws.1"2 The court of appeals had held that a conspiracy, "motivated by
an invidious animus against women,"103 to deny a right protected by Title
VII created a cause of action for damages under section 1985(c).104 The
Supreme Court reversed this decision.
Before analyzing Novotny, it is necessary to consider the express scope
and the remedial scheme of Title VII, as well as the judicial interpreta-
tion of section 1985(c) and other pre-existing civil rights statutes in rela-
tion to Title VII. With this background, the significance of the Court's
decision in Novotny can be assessed.
2. Title VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,18 by way of its definitional
sections, prohibits certain "unlawful employment practices" for employ-
ers, employment agencies and labor organizations.108 Actions taken with
101. 442 U.S. 366, 369 (1979). For the text of § 1985(c), see note 13 supra.
102. Id. The district court had dismissed the case because the directors of a single corpo-
ration could not, as a matter of law and fact, engage in a conspiracy. Id.
103. 584 F.2d 1235, 1243 (3rd Cir. 1978).
104. Novotny had alleged a violation of § 704(a) of Title VII, which states in part: "It
shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his
employees. . . because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice
by this subchapter, or because he had made a charge testified, assisted, or participated in
any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter." 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-3(a) (1976).
105. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976). The constitutional support for Congress's authority to en-
act Title VII is found in the Commerce Clause (U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8(3)); hence the perva-
siveness of the discriminatory acts it can reach. See Satty v. Nashville Gas Co., 384 F. Supp.
765 (M.D. Tenn. 1974), aff'd, 522 F.2d 850 (6th Cir. 1975). See also N. Schlei, supra note
14.
106. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, 2000e-2, 2000e-3, 2000e-16(a) (1976). The practices made unlaw-
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respect to an individual's employment or employment opportunities are
made unlawful if they are based on an individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin or because an individual has opposed any such un-
lawful employment practice or filed a charge or somehow participated in
a proceeding pursuant to other sections of Title VII. 10 7 These prohibitions
are obviously far-reaching, and the courts have interpreted them broadly
as to what acts will amount to "unlawful discrimination."'0 8
While the legislative history of the addition of the word "sex" to Title
VII's list of prohibited bases of discrimination is all but non-existent, 09
courts have stated that Title VII was enacted out of growing congres-
sional awareness and concern for sex discrimination. It has been stated
that Congress's purpose was to provide a legal foundation for the princi-
ple of non-discrimination in employment based on sex as well as "sus-
pect" classifications, 10 to provide equal access to the job market for both
men and women,"' and "to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate
treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes."" 2
ful include the failure to hire or the discharge or any other discrimination with respect to
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment or employment opportunities
of an employee, a job applicant, or an apprentice, because of the individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) to 2(d) (1976).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1976).
108. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). This case is well-known for
its "effects" test, i.e., a qualification for employment may be "fair in form, but discrimina-
tory in operation." Id. at 431. The use of such a qualification is still made unlawful under
Title VII, notwithstanding a lack of discriminatory intent by the employer. Id. at 432. Cf.
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (suit filed by black policemen in 1970 before the
1972 amendments to Title VII included public employees; therefore, case decided on the
basis of fifth amendment equal protection standards--different from Title VII standards
developed in Griggs in that proof of invidious intent and not just disproportionate impact
required).
See also Zichy v. City of Philadelphia, 392 F. Supp. 338 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Sale v.
Waverly-Shell Rock Bd. of Educ., 390 F. Supp. 784 (N.D. Iowa 1975); Satty v. Nashville Gas
Co., 384 F. Supp. 765 (M.D. Tenn. 1974), af'd, 522 F.2d 850 (6th Cir. 1975). But see Wil-
lingham v. Macon Tel. Publish. Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975) (Congress did not intend
its non-discriminatory command, with respect to sex, at least, to have sweeping
implications).
109. For sources and comments regarding the "sex" amendment to Title VII, see note 16,
supra.
110. See Sailer Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal.3d 1, 19-20, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 340-41 (1971). For
a discussion of suspect classifications, see notes 217-19 infra.
111. Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 950 (1971). Accord, Sale v. Waverly-Shell Rock Bd. of Educ., 390 F. Supp. 784 (N.D.
Iowa 1975).
112. Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 991 (1971). Accord, Ridinger v. General Motors Corp., 325 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D. Ohio
1971). See also Rosen v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 328 F. Supp. 454 (D.N.J. 1970),
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The administration of Title VII's proscriptions was placed under the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which the act created and
empowered to promulgate suitable regulations. 113 Between the statute
and the EEOC regulations, an elaborate system was created for the
processing of discrimination complaints and obtaining voluntary compli-
ance through "informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persua-
sion."" 4 Once this administrative procedure has been exhausted by the
complainant and no conciliation agreement has been obtained, a right to
a civil action in federal court is expressly granted.115 The plaintiff may
request and, if successful on the merits, may be granted such equitable
relief as may be appropriate as well as other "affirmative action ...
which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of em-
ployees, with or without back pay. . . , or any other equitable relief as
the court deems appropriate."1116 Furthermore, reasonable attorney's fees
may be awarded to the prevailing party.1117
While the provisions of the statute and the EEOC regulations are cer-
tainly thorough, their complexity has proven to be somewhat burdensome
and the proscribed administrative procedures quite lengthy,1128 causing
persons aggrieved by Title VII violations to seek more expeditious routes
of redress. The Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have, for the
most part, been sympathetic to such efforts.
remanded on other grounds, 477 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1973).
113. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4(a) and 2000e-12 (1976); 29 C.F.R. §§ 1600 to 1613 (1979). Al-
-though the regulations and the Commission's findings under its administrative proceedings
do not carry the weight of law, they are "entitled to great deference" by the courts in subse-
quent litigation. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971).
114. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b); 29 C.F.R. §§ 1600-02 (1979). For an instructive guide to the
administrative process, see B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW,
chs. 26-29 (1976) [hereinafter cited as SCHL.EI & GROSSMAN].
115. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f)(1), 2000e-5(f)(3) (1976). For an instructive review on the pro-
cedural aspects of Title VII litigation, see SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 114, ch. 30; Casey
and Slaybod, Procedural Aspects of Title VII Litigation: Pitfalls for the Unwary Attorney,
7 U. TOL. L. REV. 87 (1975).
116. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). As to the equitable nature of an award of back pay and the
circumstances under which such an award might be made, see generally Annot., 21 A.L.R.
Fed. 472 (1974).
117. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976). As to when an award of attorney's fees might be ap-
propriate, see generally Annot., 16 A.L.R. Fed. 643 (1973).
118. See Peck, The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission: Developments in the
Administrative Process 1965-1975, 51 WASH. L. REv. 831 (1976). See generally Blumrosen,
Developments in Equal Employment Opportunity Law-1976, 36 FED. B.J. 55, 60 (1977);
Blumrosen, The Crossroads for Equal Employment Opportunity: Incisive Administration
or Indecisive Bureaucracy?, 49 NoTRE DAME LAW. 46 (1973).
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In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,119 the Supreme Court held that
the civil action created by Title VII is not an exclusive remedy for the
victim of racial discrimination in violation of the statute, stating that the
statute's purpose was "to supplement, rather than supplant, existing laws
and institutions relating to employment discrimination." 20 One year
later, in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 21 the Court held that
the exhaustion of Title VII and EEOC administrative remedies is not re-
quired before filing suit under section 1981122 for damages resulting from
racial discrimination.
Some lower federal courts had already developed the rationale that the
remedies contemplated by Title VII were not co-extensive with those of
earlier civil rights statutes, i.e., the availability of a Title VII action does
not necessarily preclude recovery based on statutes already protecting
against violations of the same rights. The courts have allowed actions to
be maintained not only under section 1981, when racial discrimination in
employment is alleged,123 but also under section 1983, when employment
discrimination involves state action.124 In both such situations, Title VII's
119. 415 U.S. 35 (1974).
120. Id. at 48-49. Cf. Brown v. General Services Admin., 425 U.S. 820 (1976) (§ 717 of
Title VII [42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1976)] is the exclusive judicial remedy for federal employ-
ees). See also 110 Cong. Rec. 7207 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Bayh: "Of course, Title VII is not
intended to and does not deny to any individual, rights and remedies which he may pursue
under other Federal and State statutes").
121. 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
122. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976) was originally enacted as part of § 1 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1866 (Act of April 9, 1866, 14 Stat. 27) and provides, in pertinent part:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right
... to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full
and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property
as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penal-
ties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
123. Young v. International Tel. & Tel. Co., 438 F.2d 757 (3d Cir. 1971) (§ 1981). Accord,
Caldwell v. National Brewing Co., 443 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 916
(1972). See generally SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 114, ch. 21; Larson, The Development
of Section 1981 as a Remedy for Racial Discrimination in Private Employment, 7 HARv.
C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 56 (1972).
124. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). Of course, the state action requirement of § 1983 may be a
substantial barrier. Compare Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1975) (sex dis-
crimination case; allegations sufficient to establish state action under § 1983) with Cohen v.
Illinois Inst. of Tech., 524 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 943 (1979) (sex
discrimination case; allegations insufficient under § 1983). See also Martin v. Pacific N.W.
Bell Tel. Co., 441 F.2d 1116 (9th Cir. 1971) (religious discrimination); Puntolillo v. New
Hampshire Racing Comm., 390 F. Supp. 231 (D.N.H. 1975) (national origin discrimination);
Scott v. University of Del., 385 F. Supp. 937 (D. Del. 1974) (racial discrimination).
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prescribed administrative procedures can be circumvented.12
Since the Supreme Court's holding in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
Transportation Co.,'2" that "[section] 1981 is applicable to racial discrim-
ination in private employment against white persons,"'21 it is well settled
that, at least in the racial context or where state action is involved, Title
VII is not the exclusive source of an individual's right of action against an
allegedly discriminatory employer. The victim of sex discrimination who
cannot come within the ambit of either section 1981128 or section 1983,
has only section 1985(c) 129 as an alternative to a cause of action under
Title VII.
3. Section 1985(c)
The early interpretation of section 1985(c) by the Supreme Court im-
parted to this section the state action requirement of section 1983,130
since the congressional authority for its enactment was found to be in the
fourteenth amendment.'' In United States v. Price,132 the statute was
125. Where it is possible to choose among § 1981, § 1983, and Title VII as the basis for
plaintiff's suit, it should be noted that under some circumstances relief, whether equitable
or monetary damages, may be available only under § 1981 and Title VII. Compare Monroe
v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (money damages cannot be awarded in § 1983 suit against
municipality) and City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973) (equitable relief is not
available in § 1983 suit against municipality) with Garner v. Giarusso, 571 F.2d 1330 (5th
Cir. 1978) (monetary damages can be awarded in § 1981 suit against municipality) and Fitz-
patrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (monetary damages can be awarded in Title VII suits
against states or municipalities) and Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972) (equitable relief can be obtained under § 1981 suit against state
officials). See generally SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 114, ch. 21.
126. 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
127. Id. at 287. The lower federal courts have also permitted a member of an ethnic group
to maintain a suit under § 1981. Apodaca v. General Elec. Co., 445 F. Supp. 821 (D.N.M.
1978) (Spanish-surnamed plaintiff within ambit of § 1981 if racial animus can be demon-
strated). Accord, Cubas v. Rapid Am. Corp., 420 F. Supp. 663 (E.D. Pa. 1976). But see
Budinsky v. Coming Glass Works, 425 F. Supp. 786 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (discrimination -on
basis of national origin not actionable under § 1981).
128. The courts have consistently refused to extend § 1981 to encompass sex discrimina-
tion. See O'Connell v. Teachers College, 63 F.R.D. 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); League of Academic
Women v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 343 F. Supp. 636 (N.D. Cal. 1972); NOW v. Bank of Cal.,
6 F.E.P. 26 (N.D. Cal. 1972). See also SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 114, 610 n.23 and
cases cited therein.
129. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(c) (1976).
130. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
131. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5. The state action requirement of § 1985(c) originated in
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1975) and was reiterated in Collins v. Hardyman,
341 U.S. 651 (1951).
132. 383 U.S. 787 (1966).
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held by the Court to be applicable to a conspiracy where private citizens
acted in concert with public officials.
Under United States v. Guest,13 3 however, a private conspiracy was
held to be covered by section 1985(c) if its predominant purpose is inter-
ference with or deprivation of constitutionally protected rights. In 1971
the Court held, in Griffin v. Breckenridge,13 that section 1985(c) is also
applicable to private conspiracies if the object of such a conspiracy is the
deprivation of equal rights, motivated by "some racial, or perhaps other-
wise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus. ' ' 35
These decisions do not make clear what "otherwise class-based" dis-
crimination must occur to bring a private conspiracy within the ambit of
section 1985(c). It is not surprising that the lower federal courts are in
disagreement as to the proper interpretation and application of Price,
Guest, and Griffin.3 6
The possible remedies available under section 1985(c) have also not
been clarified. In Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.,137 the Su-
preme Court compared the remedies available under Title VII with those
under section 1981, stating:
[B]oth equitable and legal relief, including compensatory and, under certain
circumstances, punitive damages [and a back pay award not subject to the
restriction of Title VII, might be possible under section 1981].
[On the other hand] Title VII offers assistance in investigation, counsel,
waiver of court costs, and attorneys' fees, items that are unavailable under
[section] 1981.18
133. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
134. 402 U.S. 88 (1971).
135. 403 U.S. at 101-102.
136. Compare Bellamy v. Mason's Stores, Inc., 508 F.2d 504, 507 (4th Cir. 1974) (state
involvement required in § 1985(c) claim where plaintiff alleged he was fired by private em-
ployer because "there are no Equal Protection Clause rights against wholly private action")
and Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1972) (narrow reading of Griffin v.
Breckenridge; absent racial context or interstate travel, only fourteenth amendment rights
are protected by § 1985(c) and state action is required) with Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522
F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1975) (no state action requirement for § 1985(c) but on remand, trial court
would need to determine whether alleged sex discrimination was "class-based, invidiously
discriminatory animus" required under Griffin and if not, whether violation of Title VII
would suffice) and Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971) (broad reading of Guest
and Griffin; since deprivation of plaintiff's first amendment rights was protected under the
fourteenth amendment, no state action required).
137. 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
138. Id. at 460. See also Sabol v. Snyder, 524 F.2d 1009 (10th Cir. 1975) (punitive dam-
ages possible in a suit brought under §§ 1981 and 1983); Sabala v. Western Gillette, Inc., 516
F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1975) (attorney's fees award possible, upon showing bad faith or unrea-
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The same reasoning would logically apply to section 1985(c) so that the
available remedies, in major part, should be quite similar and would in-
clude, among other things, back pay, as well as compensatory damages,
injunctive relief, and reinstatement. 13 9
Section 1985(c), then, may provide a beneficial remedial alternative to
the victim of sex discrimination who wishes to bypass the cumbersome
administrative procedure of Title VII or to seek relief beyond its restric-
tions, but who is precluded from bringing suit under sections 1981 and
1983. Not only might compensatory or punitive damages be available, but
a jury trial might also be available. 14
Since section 1985(c) creates no substantive rights,"' the question is
whether such a plaintiff may assert rights created under a federal statute,
such as Title VII, through the remedial provisions of section 1985(c).
Some lower federal courts have permitted a plaintiff in a sex discrimina-
tion employment context to maintain a cause of action under section
1985(c), stating that the private conspiracy alleged was within the reach
of the statute because the object of the conspiracy was the deprivation of
plaintiff's federally created Title VII right to be free from sex-based em-
ployment discrimination. 42 One commentator has drawn a parallel be-
tween section 1985(c) and section 241 of the Civil Rights Act of 1870,' s4
sonableness of defendant, in suit brought under Title VII and § 1981); Carter v. Gallagher,
452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972) (whatever injunctive relief is
appropriate under the circumstances in § 1981 suit). But see Claiborne v. Illinois Cent. R.R.,
401 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. La. 1975) (punitive damages available under Title VII if circum-
stances warrant).
See generally SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 114, pp. 638-39, 1258-59.
139. See, e.g., Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971).
140. A jury trial is not constitutionally mandated under a Title VII civil action since it is
exclusively equitable in nature. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 443-44 (1975)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring). Accord, Slack v. Havens, 522 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1975) and
cases cited therein. See generally, Sape & Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 824 (1972).
141. Howard v. State Dept. of Highways, 478 F.2d 581 (10th Cir. 1973). Contra, Poirier v.
Hodges, 445 F. Supp. 838 (M.D. Fla. 1978). Of course § 1985(c) is not without problems. See
notes 130-38 supra and accompanying text. See generally SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note
114, pp. 629-635.
142. Milner v. National Inst. of Health Technology, 409 F. Supp. 1389 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
Accord, Fannie v. Chamberlain Mfg. Corp., 445 F. Supp. 65 (W.D. Pa. 1977). Contra, Doski
v. Goldseker Co., 539 F.2d 1326 (4th Cir. 1976); Abbott v. Moore Bus. Forms, 439 F. Supp.
643 (D.N.H. 1977); Parish v. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, 437 F. Supp. 623 (D.
Md. 1977). See also Poirier v. Hodges, 445 F. Supp. 838 (M.D. Fla. 1978); Local 1, Team-
sters Union v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 419 F. Supp. 263 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (§ 1985(c)
held applicable to right created under Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act).
143. 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1976).
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providing criminal penalties for similar conspiracies. Since section 241
has been construed by the Supreme Court to cover conspiracies to de-
prive a plaintiff of a right created by a federal statute,"" a similar con-
struction of section 1985(c) may be appropriate. 145
The Supreme Court's holding in Brown v. General Services Adminis-
tration 14 would seem to create some difficulty in extending this theory to
Title VII rights, however. In Brown, the Court dismissed a section 1981
suit brought by a black federal employee alleging that racial discrimina-
tion had caused denial of his promotions. The Court held that section
717147 of Title VII is the exclusive remedy for federal employees. Examin-
ing the legislative history of the amendment which added this section, the
Court reasoned that Congress intended to provide federal employees the
same access to the federal courts which private employees enjoyed under
the existing provisions of Title VII as originally enacted. Since Congress
obviously was convinced that federal employees were without any remedy
before the amendment, the section fashioned an elaborate and complete
mechanism which could not have been designed to supplement anything;
rather, Congress intended its remedy to be "an exclusive, pre-emptive
administrative and judicial scheme for the redress of federal employment
discrimination."' 48
Since the victims of sex discrimination by private employers were also
without a remedy in the federal courts prior to the passage of Title VII,'1 4
the effect of the Brown holding could be to preclude any alternatives to
Title VII as to such persons. This issue remained unresolved when
144. See United States v. Waddell, 112 U.S. 76 (1884).
145. Note, Section 1985(c): A Viable Alternative tb Title VII for Sex-Based Employ-
ment Discrimination, [1978] WASH. U.L.Q. 367, 380-86 [hereinafter cited as Section 1985(c):
A Viable Alternative]. This analytical approach is supported by the fact that the Supreme
Court in Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. at 98, drew a similar parallel between § 1985(c)
and its "closest remaining criminal analogue... 18 U.S.C. § 241," in considering whether
state action should be required in the civil liability context. The Court's conclusion was that
§ 1985(c) would not always require state action since that was not essential to a § 241 crimi-
nal action.
146. 425 U.S. 820 (1976).
147. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1976). This section was added to Title VII in 1972 to include
federal employees within the scope of its protection. The Civil Service Commission was
granted powers similar to those of the EEOC. See note 106 supra.
"148. 425 U.S. at 829 (emphasis added). Justice Stevens (joined by Justice Brennan) ex-
amined the same legislative history and found support for an opposite conclusion, placing
heavy reliance ofi the rejection of an amendment which would have expressly established §
717 as an exclusive remedy. Id. at 838 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
149. Note that all the cases cited in note 142 supra, supporting the use of § 1985(c) to
reach the private employer were decided after Title VII was enacted.
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Novotny came before the Supreme Court.
4. Great American Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Novotny
The first step in the Court's decision in Novotny concerned the func-
tion of section 1985(c). Simply stated, section 1985(c) creates no substan-
tive rights for the victim of a conspiracy. Rather, if a right designated by
section 1985(c)--"equal protection of the laws, or . .. equal privileges
and immunities under the laws"-is violated by a conspiracy, the victim
is entitled to damages. Thus the question becomes, what are these rights
designated by section 1985(c)? More specifically, the question here is
whether a violation of section 704(a) of Title VII-discrimination by an
employer because an employee has opposed a practice unlawful under the
statute-amounts to a deprivation of the rights covered by section
1985(c). 15 °
In reaching its decision that section 1985(c) cannot be used to seek
damages under a violation of Title VII, the Court explained the purpose
of Title VII and the preferred means of achieving that purpose. The pur-
pose of the Act is "to assure equality of employment opportunities by
eliminating those practices and devices that discriminate on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."'15 The preferred means of
achieving this goal, however, is not through the legal remedy of damages,
especially if the damages could be punitive. Rather, when Title VII was
enacted, Congress provided a comprehensive procedure for accomplishing
the purpose of the Act through "[c]ooperation and voluntary compli-
ance." 152 This procedure would be completely bypassed if Novotny were
allowed to bring his suit under section 1985(c).
Novotny is not denied eventual access to the courts for damages under
Title VII. However, Title VII provides for only an action in equity, with a
possible award of back pay, and does not allow general or punitive dam-
ages. Under section 1985(c), Novotny would be entitled to these general
and punitive damages. 58 The Court did not allow Novotny to circumvent
the Title VII requirements and stated: "Unimpaired effectiveness can be
given to the plan put together by Congress in Title VII only by holding
that deprivation of a right created by Title VII cannot be the basis for a
cause of action under [section] 1985[(c)]."'
150. 442 U.S. at 369-70.
151. Id. at 370, quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1973).
152. 442 U.S. at 370.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 378.
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In a footnote, the Court noted the "relative narrowness of the specific
issue before the Court."'1 55 The Court did not consider what would be the
result if the defendant were not subject to a suit under Title VII or a
similar statute and a plaintiff brought an action under section 1985(c).
Neither did the Court consider whether the wording of section 1985(c)
implies a remedy for a statutory right other than "those fundamental
rights derived from the Constitution."' "
Justice Powell, in his concurrence, dealt with this latter issue. He would
go further than the majority decision and indeed hold that section
1985(c) is confined to conspiracies to deny a "fundamental right derived
from the Constitution.' 57 These fundamental rights would not include a
right to any specific private employment.
Justice Stevens, in his concurrence with the majority opinion and with
Justice Powell, explained that the legislative history of the 1871 act
reveals that Congress was concerned only with rights protected by the
Constitution, especially the fourteenth amendment. 158 Thus private con-
spiracies to deprive a person of these rights are actionable under section
1985(c). Outside of this area, private acts of discrimination are not uncon-
stitutional, and "[p]rivate discrimination on the basis of sex is not pro-
hibited by the Constitution. The right to be free of sex discrimination by
other private parties is a statutory right that was created almost a cen-
tury after 1985[(c)] was enacted.' 5
Justice White wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Brennan
and Marshall joined. The dissenting justices viewed section 1985(c) as a
supplement to other federal rights, giving the plaintiff additional redress
when one of his federal rights is violated by an "invidious" conspiracy.
Thus, according to the dissent, two remedies are available to Novotny.
first, he has a remedy under Title VII for the violation of a federal right;
second, he has a remedy under section 1985(c) because the right was vio-
lated by an "invidious and threatening" conspiracy. 60
5. Conclusion
From the majority holding in Novotny, it appears that this case re-
155. Id. at 370 n.6.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 379. For a discussion on fundamental rights, see J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, J.
YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUONAL LAW, at 410-19 (1978).
158. 442 U.S. at 382-83.
159. Id. at 385.
160. Id. at 385-96.
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solves the issue left open in Brown.1" If Title VII provides a remedy not
previously available under a federal statute or under the Constitution,
Title VII is the exclusive remedy available. On the other hand, Title VII
does not eradicate pre-existing statutory rights. Thus, because a victim of
race discrimination in private employment was covered under section
1981 before Title VII was enacted, the right remains, giving the victim of
race discrimination in private employment dual avenues of recovery. No
such statute was available to the victim of sex discrimination in private
employment before the passage of Title VII, and, therefore, he has only a
single statutory remedy.
The holding by the Court in Novotny that section 1985(c) creates no
substantive rights limits the relief available to the victim of either race or
sex discrimination and does not appear to draw intentionally a distinction
between the two forms of discrimination. Yet the holding is more restric-
tive to the victim of sex discrimination since he is also precluded from
section 1981, one of the civil rights statutes created when the legislature
and the courts were more concerned with race discrimination than with
sex discrimination.
However, if the victim of sex discrimination is, for some reason, not
protected under Title VII, the possibility exists that the Court might
"fashion" a remedy out of section 1985(c). As the Court itself noted, the
question is still unresolved as to whether the plaintiff would be allowed to
use section 1985(c) if the discriminatory act were not covered by a federal
statute.162 Also unanswered is whether section 1985(c) will in the future
be held to apply only to fundamental rights.
D. Damages Under the Fifth Amendment: Davis v. Passman
1. Introduction
The plaintiff in Davis v. Passman6 3 based her sex discrimination
charge on the fifth amendment and sought money damages. Davis had
been dismissed from her position as deputy administrative assistant to
Representative Otto Passman, a United States Congressman from Louisi-
ana. Davis alleged that she was dismissed solely on the basis of her sex.'"
161. Brown v. General Services Administration, 425 U.S. 820 (1976). See text accompany-
ing notes 147-49 supra.
162. 442 U.S. at 370 n.6.
163. 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
164. Id. at 231. Representative Passman wrote Davis a letter in which he stated that al-
though she was "able, energetic and a very hard worker," "I concluded that it was essential
that the understudy to my administrative assistant be a man." Id. at 230-31 n.3.
[Vol. 14:515
1980] SEX DISCRIMINATION CASES 543
Since Passman was no longer in office when Davis' suit reached the
courts, her only available remedy was damages in the form of backpay 6 5
This remedy of money damages is not expressly created in the language
of the fifth amendment. The district court, and ultimately the court of
appeals, had denied jurisdiction, holding that no cause of action for
money damages may be implied from the due process clause of the fifth
amendment.6 The Supreme Court reversed this holding. Before analyz-
ing Davis v. Passman, this section of the note will provide a survey of the
cases wherein the Supreme Court had previously confronted the issue of
the availability of money damages under the Constitution.
2. Jurisdiction
The lower courts in Davis had held, in effect, that if the relief re-
quested could not be granted, the court would deny jurisdiction. How-
ever, the issue of jurisdiction and the issue of the availability of the re-
quested relief are two separate questions. Because the lower courts
appeared to have confused these issues, the Supreme Court discussed the
technical distinctions between the lack of subject matter jurisdiction and
the failure of the plaintiff to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.
The jurisdictional barrier facing a plaintiff is a formidable obstacle,
given the overriding principles of federalism and the consequent limita-
tions on the matters which the federal courts have power to decide.167 A
plaintiff bringing suit against the federal government or a federal official
must rely on 28 U.S.C. section 1331(a),168 which grants federal courts the
165. Id. at 231 n.4.
166. 571 F.2d 793, 801 (5th Cir. 1978). After the District Court for the Western District of
Louisiana had dismissed Davis's claim, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed
and remanded. 544 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1977). The Court of Appeals granted a rehearing en
banc and affirmed the District Court's decision that the plaintiff did not have an implied
cause of action. 571 F.2d at 801. Davis could not use Title VII because congressional em-
ployees are not within the protection of the Act. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. at 247. The
Supreme Court stated that the exclusion of federal congressional employees from the cover-
age of Title VII was not intended "to foreclose alternative remedies available to those not
covered by the statute." Id.
167. See generally, WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS §§ 1, 7-8 (3d ed. 1976) [hereinafter
cited as WRIGHT]. Unless a plaintiff's jurisdictional statement properly supports the court's
power to hear the subject matter of the suit, all is for naught. Dismissal can be obtained by
the defendant or effected by the court on its own motion at any stage of the litigation if a
deficiency is found in subject matter jurisdiction. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
168. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976). It is a much simpler matter where state action is in-
volved, since a plaintiff under § 1983 has ready access to the federal court's jurisdiciton
under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1976) which grants the federal courts jurisdiction over civil ac-
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power to decide questions "arising under the Constitution, laws, or trea-
ties of the United States."
Such general federal question jurisdiction was upheld by the Supreme
Court in Bell v. Hood,'8 9 involving a money damages claim for injuries
suffered as a result of alleged infringement of fourth amendment rights.17 0
The district court had dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter juris-
diction and the court of appeals affirmed.17 ' In reversing the dismissal,
the Supreme Court found that the complaint clearly was based solely on
the violation of rights protected by the Constitution, and since the claim
was neither immaterial nor frivolous,1 2 jurisdiction was proper under sec-
tion 1331(a). 17 3 Whether the complaint stated a valid cause of action and
whether the plaintiff was entitled to prevail on the merits were decisions
to be made after jurisdiction was taken, and not before.1 4
The lower federal courts have used reasoning similar to that of Bell to
rule on the appropriateness of subject matter jurisdiction where the con-
troversy was based solely and directly on a claim of deprivation of rights
protected under the Constitution.'" It is now well settled that section
tions such as § 1983 claims.
169. 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
170. U.S. CONST. amend. IV, provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
171. Bell v. Hood, 150 F.2d 96 (9th Cir. 1945).
172. Indeed, the Court stated that plaintiff's claim raised "serious questions, both of law
and fact." 327 U.S. at 683.
This concern with materiality and frivolousness emanates from the requirement of §
1331(a) that the federal question so raised must be substantial. A plaintiff cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of federal courts by attaching to what is essentially a non-federal claim an im-
material or frivolous federal question that is otherwise proper. See generally WRIGHT, supra
note 167, §§ 17-19.
173. 327 U.S. at 682. The Court cited several earlier cases where federal jurisdiction had
been sustained for claims of money damages sought by persons alleging deprivation of the
constitutional right to vote. See, Swafford v. Templeton, 185 U.S. 487 (1902); Wiley v. Sin-
kler, 179 U.S. 58 (1900); Brickhouse v. Brooks, 165 F. 534 (1908).
174. 327 U.S. at 682.
175. The lower courts have held that the fourteenth amendment supports jurisdiction in
the following cases where the defendant, either a school board or municipality, could not be
reached under § 1983: Gentile v. Wallen, 562 F.2d 193 (2d Cir. 1977); Owen v. City of Inde-
pendence, 560 F.2d 925 (8th Cir. 1977); Lewis v. District of Columbia Dept. of Corrections,
533 F.2d 710 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (District of Columbia held not subject to § 1983 suit in Dis-
trict of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973)); Brault v. Town of Milton, 527 F.2d 730,
rev'd en banc on other grounds, 527 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1975); Panzarella v. Boyle, 406 F.
Supp. 787 (D.R.I. 1975).
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1331(a) supports such jurisdiction inasmuch as the Supreme Court has
reaffirmed Bell in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal
Bureau of Narcotics7'8 and Butz v. Economou.17
3. Money Damages Under the Constitution
A question left open in Bell v. Hood"'s was whether the allegedly un-
constitutional conduct of a federal official gives rise to a cause of action
for money damages when such an action is based solely on the Constitu-
tion. This issue came before the Supreme Court again in Bivens,1 s9 a case
quite similar to Bell on its facts. In Bivens, the Court held that violations
of fourth amendment rights by federal agents acting under color of their
authority could be redressed by a monetary award for damages suffered
as a result of such conduct. The Court stated that the fourth amendment
serves as an "independent limitation upon the exercise of federal
power"180 and reaches beyond tortious conduct as defined by local state
law. As such, conduct in violation of the amendment's restrictions is both"necessary and sufficient to make out the plaintiff's cause of action."''s
Despite the fact that the fourth amendment does not expressly provide
for its enforcement through a damages award, such a remedy is generally
available in the federal courts and "[h]istorically, [money] damages have
been regarded as the ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal inter-
ests in liberty."18 2 The Court also cited its reference in Bell to the well
settled proposition that "where federally protected rights have been in-
Other constitutional amendments were held to support jurisdiction in the following cases:
Paton v. La Prade, 524 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1975) (first amendment); Cox v. Stanton, 529 F.2d
47 (4th Cir. 1975) (thirteenth and fourteenth amendments); Fitzgerald v. Porter Memorial
Hosp., 523 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1975) (fourteenth amendment); Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v.
United States, 515 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1975) (fifth amendment); Apton v. Wilson, 506 F.2d
83 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (fourth and fifth amendments); Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938 (D.C.
Cir. 1973) (same); Berthea v. Reid, 445 F.2d 1163 (3d Cir. 1971) (same); Patmore v. Carlson,
392 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. I1. 1975) (fifth and eighth amendments).
176. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
177. 438 U.S. 478 (1978). The major thrust of the Court's opinion in Butz concerned the
scope of the defendant federal official's absolute immunity defense to allege violations of
plaintiff's first and fifth amendment rights. The Court ruled that certain federal officials,
though acting in an administrative setting, were performing essentially judicial functions
and would therefore enjoy absolute immunity. Others, whose duties were essentially admin-
istrative would only be granted qualified immunity, under the circumstances outlined in
Scheuen v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
178. 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
179. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
180. Id. 'at 394.
181. Id. at 395.
182. Id.
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vaded, it has been the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to
adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief."183
The necessity for such a remedy to enforce the safeguards guaranteed
by the fourth amendment was not of major concern to the Court, since
Congress had not expressly excluded this particular remedy from the
reach of injured plaintiffs, thereby relegating such claims to some other
remedial scheme equally effective in their legislative judgment. Further-
more, the Court noted that there were no "special factors counselling hes-
itation [to create such a remedy judicially] in the absence of affirmative
action by Congress. 184
Justice Harlan's oft-cited concurring opinion in Bivens offered further
support for the majority's decision. He reasoned that if the Court were to
adopt the notion asserted by respondents, such a holding would produce
an anomalous result. If the Constitution were interpreted so that the
power to authorize damages as a remedy for the vindication of a federal
constitutional right rests exclusively with Congress, then the federal
courts would be powerless to protect the very rights which they were spe-
cifically created to safeguard.18 5 Justice Harlan drew a parallel to the
broad discretionary powers of the federal courts to grant any form of eq-
uitable relief, provided that subject matter jurisdiction is proper, and
stated that the ability to grant traditional remedies at law, namely, dam-
ages, should be equally unfettered. This reasoning was particularly appro-
priate with regard to Webster Bivens, since it was too late for equitable
relief to benefit him, and a fortiori, to redress the wrong he had suffered,
"it [was either] damages or nothing."""8 This is the anomalous result
which the majority clearly intended to avoid, since "[tihe very essence of
civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual claim the
protection of the laws whenever he receives an injury. s187
183. Id. at 392, quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946).
184. 403 U.S. at 396. To illustrate what those "special factors" might be, the Court ex-
plained some of its earlier decisions, contrasting those in which judicial creation of a dam-
ages remedy was granted with those in which such a remedy was denied, even though the
federal statute under which the action was brought created substantive rights. Compare J. I.
Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (remedy granted to effectuate the underlying policy
of the federal securities laws) and Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933) (remedy
granted because duty to pay was imposed by the fifth amendment just compensation clause)
with Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 (1963) (remedy denied because no constitutional
prohibition transgressed) and United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947) (rem-
edy denied as a matter of federal fiscal policy).
185. 403 U.S. at 401-02 (Harlan, J., concurring). Harlan's discussion of the legislative his-
tory of the Bill of Rights is also quite enlightening. Id. at 400-01 n.3.
186. Id. at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
187. Marbury v. Madison, 1 U.S. (1 Cranch) 368, 378 (1803).
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While Bivens created a new remedy with respect to the fourth amend-
ment, it was unclear whether violations of other constitutional rights
could be similarly redressed, lacking affirmative congressional action.18s
Both the majority opinion and Justice Harlan's concurrence focused on
the nature of the personal interest that had been violated; 8 9 and Justice
Harlan specifically reserved the question whether money damages would
be appropriate with respect to other types of constitutionally protected
interests.1 90 It is noteworthy that this reservation was made in a discus-
sion of the ability to award damages in such cases so as to effect meaning-
ful compensation. Arguably then, a Bivens-type remedy might be justifia-
ble in any case of a constitutional violation,, regardless of the nature of
the right, per se, so long as a damage award would be ascertainable under
ordinary common law doctrinal standards.
In fact, lower federal courts have extended the Bivens holding to en-
compass a broad range of constitutionally protected rights even though
none of the constitutional provisions relied upon by the plaintiffs ex-
pressly provides for such a remedy. A money damages remedy has been
judicially created in numerous cases where jurisdiction was based solely
and directly on the Constitution and the various plaintiffs asserted viola-
tions of rights under the first, fifth, sixth, eighth, and fourteenth
amendments.19 1
188. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976), the text of which is given in note 122 supra; 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), the text of which is given in note 12 supra; 42 U.S.C. § 1985(c) (1976),
the text of which is given in note 13 supra.
189. 403 U.S. at 395-96, 402-03 (Harlan, J., concurring).
190. Id. at 409 n.9 (Harlan, J., concurring), citing his concurring opinion in Monroe v.
Pape. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
191. Bivens was extended to protect first amendment rights. See, e.g., Berlin Democratic
Club v. Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. 144, 161 (D.D.C. 1976) (interests to be protected held to be
"equally if not more fundamental" than forth amendment rights). Accord, Jihaad v. Carl-
son, 410 F. Supp. 1132 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
A Bivens type remedy was upheld where fifth amendment rights were allegedly violated.
See, e.g., Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. pending sub nom. Moffit v.
Loe (No. 78-1260); Green v. Carlson, 581 F.2d 669 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 442 U.S.
940 (1979); Jacobson v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 558 F.2d 928 (9th Cir. 1977);
States Marine Lines, Inc. v. Schultz, 498 F.2d 1146 (4th Cir. 1974); Sullivan v. Murphy, 478
F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1,
16 (1971), "nature of the violation determines the scope of the remedy"); United States ex
rel. Moore v. Koelzer, 457 F.2d 892 (3d Cir. 1972); Patmore v. Carlson, 392 F. Supp. 737
(E.D. fI1. 1975).
Bivens was also held applicable to sixth amendment rights in Bennett v. Campbell, 564
F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1977). Accord, Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. 144
(D.D.C. 1976).
Bivens was held appropriate where eighth amendment rights were asserted in Green v.
Carlson, 581 F.2d 669 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. granted 442 U.S. 940 (1979). Accord, Patmore v.
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The Supreme Court had an opportunity to extend Bivens in District of
Columbia v. Carter'9 2 and Butz v. Economou,9 3 but in each case ruled on
another issue, leaving open the question whether a violation of fifth
amendment rights could be redressed by a money damages award.
4. Davis v. Passman
The Supreme Court considered three issues in Davis: (1) the equal pro-
tection component of the fifth amendment; (2) the plaintiff's right to a
private cause of action under the fifth amendment; (3) the plaintiff's right
to damages under the fifth amendment. The first issue was not seriously
in dispute. The Court noted that the incorporation of the equal protec-
tion of the laws into the fifth amendment has been expressed in numer-
ous decisions. 9 4 The test for sex discrimination under the fifth amend-
ment is the same as under the fourteenth: "classifications by gender must
serve important government objectives and must be substantially related
to achievement of those objectives."' 95 Thus, through the equal protection
component of the due process clause, Davis had a "federal constitutional
right to be free from gender discrimination which cannot meet these
requirements."'196
The Court proceeded to the remaining questions: Does the plaintiff
have a private right of action? Does the plaintiff have an action for dam-
ages? The court of appeals in Davis had applied the Cort v. Ash test to
determine if a private cause of action could be implied when not ex-
pressly provided for.197 The Supreme Court stated that "[tihis was error,
for the question of who may enforce a statutory right is fundamentally
different than the question of who may enforce a right that is protected
Carlson, 392 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. Ill. 1975).
Violations of fourteenth amendment rights have been redressed on a Bivens theory in
Owen v. City of Independence, 560 F.2d 925 (8th Cir. 1977). Accord, Panzarella v. Boyle,
406 F. Supp. 787 (D.R.I. 1975). But see Kostka v. Hogg, 560 F.2d 37 (1st Cir. 1977) (claim
for damages against town not subject to suit under § 1983 disallowed where plaintiff had
valid cause of action against other named defendants).
See generally Lehmann, Bivens and its Progeny, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 534 (1977).
192. 409 U.S. 418 (1973). The Court ruled that a § 1983 action would not lie against the
District of Columbia, since it was not a "state or territory" within the meaning of that
statute.
193. 438 U.S. 478 (1978). The Court's holding in Economou is discussed at note 177
supra.
194. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
195. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
196. 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
197. 571 F.2d at 797-800.
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by the Constitution."198 If Congress creates a statutory right, it is appro-
priate for Congress to decide who has what type of remedy under the
statute. On the other hand, a constitutional right triggers the protection
of the judicial branch of the government to enforce this right. Thus, un-
less the Constitution expressly delegates an issue to another branch of
government, a litigant in a justiciable controversy whose constitutional
rights have been violated and who has no other effective means to enforce
these rights has access to the federal courts. 99 Davis was, therefore, "an
appropriate party to invoke the general federal question jurisdiction of
the District Court to seek relief."200 This explanation by the Supreme
Court in Davis makes it clear that Congress's intentional exclusion of a
certain area of discriminatory employment practices under a civil rights
statute does not affect the existing protection that a plaintiff has under
the Constitution.
While Davis had a cause of action under the Constitution, if the relief
she sought was not available, her complaint would not have survived a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. To avoid this contingency, the Supreme
Court in Davis extended the Bivens holding that damages may be
awarded for the violation of a constitutional right, stating that "[flor Da-
vis, as for Bivens, 'it is damages or nothing.' "201
Even in this situation, however, damages may still be denied if there
are "special factors" adverse to the award.' 02 The "special factor" in Da-
vis-the governmental position of the defendant-was not powerful
enough to bar the award of damages. While the Court might hesitate in
allowing an action for damages against a congressman "in the course of
his official conduct," this concern is not sufficient to place a congress-
man's actions above the law.20 3 The Court thus concluded that Davis had
a cause of action under the fifth amendment, and if she should prevail on
the merits, she "should be able to redress her injury in damages.' 20 4
198. 442 U.S. at 241.
199. Id. at 248.
200. Id. at 244. The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976). See
text accompanying notes 20-21 supra. See also the explanation of federal court jurisdiction,
442 U.S. at 239-40 n.18.
201. Id. at 245, quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 410.
202. 442 U.S. at 245, quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396.
203. 442 U.S. at 246. The Court noted that Passman could have some protection under
the Speech and Debate Clause. Id.
204. Id. at 248. The Court of Appeals had expressed concern with "deluging the federal
court with claims" should Davis be allowed her action for damages. 571 F.2d at 800. In
response, the Supreme Court stated, "[a] plaintiff seeking a damages remedy under the
Constitution must first demonstrate that his constitutional rights have been violated. We do
not hold that every tort by a federal official will be redressed in damages .... And, of
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5. Conclusion
Davis v. Passman indicates the willingness of the majority of the Court
to provide some type of remedy for sex discrimination, at least in the area
of employment. Although excluded under Title VII, Davis is entitled to
the same award of backpay that would be available to her under Title
VII, if she prevails on the merits. Whether employment discrimination by
a governmental official who comes within the coverage of Title VII would
still entitle the victim to a remedy of damages under the Constitution is
unresolved. While an exclusion under Title VII does not eliminate any
remedies available to those not covered by the statute,"' an inclusion and
creation by Congress of "equally effective alternative remedies" might
eliminate this need for money damages under the Constitution'06
E. Conclusion
Before the decision in Cannon, a complainant alleging sex discrimina-
tion in violation of Title IX had to proceed through the administrative
scheme expressly provided in the act. In effect, the alleged victim turned
her complaint over to HEW. HEW could decide not to investigate at all,
perhaps due to lack of resources. If HEW did investigate and find viola-
tions, the institution could choose not to comply with Title IX and in-
stead accept the elimination of federal funds. Even if the institution did
agree to comply voluntarily, the agreement need not require that specific
relief be granted the complainant who was the victim of the unlawful dis-
crimination. Therefore, it is clear that the decision in Cannon providing
the plaintiff with a private right of action grants the individual victim
who suffered the harm an essential means of vindicating her rights. With-
out this private right of action, the elimination of sex discrimination in
education that comes within the scope of Title IX would be severely
restricted.
Both Novotny and Davis are concerned with sex discrimination in em-
ployment. Section 704(a) of Title VII provides that a person cannot be
discriminated against in employment in retaliation for opposing a prac-
tice made unlawful by Title VII. As a practical matter, the victim of a
course, were Congress to create equally effective alternative remedies, the need for damages
relief might be obviated." 442 U.S. at 248. The Court also noted that through 42 U.S.C. §
1983, the damages remedy is already available in an action such as Davis' if the injuries
occur under color of state law. Id.
Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices Powell and Rehnquist, dissented on the basis of
Representative Passman's immunity under the Speech and Debate Clause. Id. at 249-51.
205. Id. at 246.
206. Id. at 248.
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violation of section 704(a) would often be able to allege a conspiracy, thus
providing the plaintiff with the alternative or additional route to relief
through section 1985(c). The decision in Novotny closed this alternative
route. The plaintiff is restricted to the remedies provided in Title VII,
including, inter alia, injunctive relief and limited backpay, and excluding
the general or punitive damages that could be available under section
1985(c). Although Novotny is without a remedy for the alleged conspir-
acy, he is of course not without a remedy for the alleged sex discrimina-
tion, provided he conforms to the procedural requirements delineated in
Title VII, including the timely filing of his complaint. Under Title VII,
Novotny also has an express private cause of action.
Novotny, included under Title VII, was restricted to the remedies pro-
vided in Title VII. Davis, excluded under Title VII, was provided the
same remedy that she would have been entitled to had she been included
under Title VII. Unlike Novotny, had Davis been denied the remedy she
sought, she would have had a constitutional right to be free of sex dis-
crimination but no remedy for the violation of this right. The Court was
unwilling to remove the right by denying the remedy. Davis thus stands
for the proposition that a victim of sex discrimination in violation of the
Constitution and outside the coverage of a federal statute is entitled to
money damages under the Constitution if no other remedy is available.
The holding is a narrow one.
Both Novotny and Davis viewed in light of Brown207 reveal the Court's
clear support of Title VII and its remedial scheme. Novotny was not al-
lowed to circumvent the administrative procedures provided in Title VII.
Davis was allowed money damages in backpay that she would have been
entitled to under Title VII, with the Court also noting that if Congress
were "to create equally effective alternative remedies, the need for dam-
ages relief might be obviated. '20 8
The decision in Cannon, while allowing the plaintiff to go beyond the
remedial scheme provided in the statute, does not contradict the ratio-
nale and-policy enunciated in the other cases. The Court in all three of
these decisions of the 1978-79 Term has protected the plaintiff's opportu-
nity for individual redress and has denied a specific remedy for sex dis-
crimination only where the victim has an alternative remedy.
207. Brown v. General Services Administration, 425 U.S. 820 (1976). See text accompany-
ing notes 147-49 supra.
208. 442 U.S. at 248.
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III. SEX DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION:
SUBSTANTIVE CONSIDERATIONS
After all the procedural requirements are met, the plaintiff must pass
the substantive analysis applied by the courts to gender classifications.
The development of the court's treatment of these equal protection
claims is important in understanding the significance of the Supreme
Court's decisions in the 1978-79 Term. The earlier cases provide the
background in which the Court searched for a definite standard to apply
to sex classifications. These will be briefly surveyed. With this foundation,
the five cases which the Supreme Court ruled upon substantively in the
past term will be analyzed to determine what the plaintiff's, and the
state's, burden will be if a gender classification is challenged.
A. Background
Classifications based on gender have received two very distinct types of
treatment in judicial review. The first was based on traditional notions of
men's and women's roles in society. Its standard was very clear and easy
to apply. The second, more recent, treatment is based less on traditional
roles of the sexes and more on the principles evolving from judicial inter-
pretation of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause. The
newer standard is uncertain and difficult to apply. This becomes more
apparent from a brief survey of the Supreme Court's opinions in the area
of gender classifications.
The Supreme Court's original view on gender classifications was that
there really was not much wrong with such classifications. Statutes that
prevented women from holding public office, serving on juries, owning or
conveying property, bringing suits in their own name, or acting as legal
custodians of their own children encountered no equal protection difficul-
ties.209 This view was perhaps most clearly established in Justice Brad-
ley's concurring opinion in Bradwell v. Illinois,210 in which he stated
Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The'natural and
proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently un-
fits it for many of the occupations of civil life. The constitution of the fam-
ily organization, which is founded in the devine ordinance, as well as in the
nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly be-
longs to the domain and functions of womanhood. The harmony, not to say
209. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685 (1973). See generally L. KANTOWiTZ, WO-
MEN AND THE LAW: THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 5-6 (1969); G. MYDRAL, AN AMERICAN Di-
LEMMA 1073 (20th Anniversary Ed. 1962).
210. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
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identity, of interests and views which belong, or should belong, to the family
institution is repugnant to the idea of a woman adopting a distinct and in-
dependent career from that of her husband. . . . The paramount destiny
and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and
mother. This is the law of the Creator.2 11
This view remained essentially the same through the 1960's. In 1961,
the Court stated in Hoyt v. Florida that, "[the] constitutional proposition
[that a State may constitutionally 'confine' jury duty 'to males'] has gone
unquestioned for more than eighty years in the decisions of the Court
. . . . Even were it to be assumed that this question is still open to de-
bate, the present case tenders narrower issues. ' 212 Thus, the Court found
no equal protection difficulties with laws prohibiting women from jury
duty, not to mention laws, such as Florida's, which merely automatically
exempted women from jury duty unless they filed a letter with the clerk
of court to the effect that they wished to be considered for jury duty.21"At
the time of this decision, three states still prohibited women from jury
duty.21 '
Then in the 1970's a new type of judicial review of classifications based
on gender emerged. The Supreme Court, in 1971, decided the case of
Reed v. Reed,21 5 apparently established a new standard of review for gen-
der classifications, one that did not fit very well into either of the well
established levels of review in equal protection cases-rational basis or
strict scrutiny.
The rational basis test is perhaps best expressed in the Court's decision
of Williams v. Lee Optical Co., in which the Court, through Justice Doug-
las, stated, "the law need not be in every respect logically consistent with
its aims to be constitutional. It is enough that there is an evil at hand for
211. Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring).
212. 368 U.S. 57, 60 (1961).
213. FLA. STAT. § 40.01(1) (1959), provided in part that "the name of no female person
shall be taken for jury service unless said person has registered with the clerk of the circuit
court her desire to be placed on the jury list."
Hoyt was re-examined and not followed by the Court in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522
(1975). LA. CONST., art. VII, § 41, provided that women could not serve on juries unless they
filed a letter with the clerk of court indicating their desire to serve. Taylor's conviction of a
crime by a jury constituted under this provision was overturned as a violation of the sixth
amendment right to a trial by a jury composed of a fair cross section of the population. The
Court said "[ilf it was ever the case that women are unqualified to sit on juries or were so
situated that none of them should be required to perform jury service, that time has long
since passed." The Court then overruled contrary implications of Hoyt v. Florida.
214. ALA. CODE, tit. 30, § 21 (Recompiled vol. 1958); Miss. CODE ANN., § 1762 (Recom-
piled vol. 1956); S.C. CODE, § 38-52 (1952).
215. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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correction, and that the particular legislative measure was a rational way
to correct it." '216 Thus the rational basis test is very deferential to the
legislatures. All that the state need show to pass this test is (1) that the
purpose of the statute is a legitimate one and (2) that the classification
created by the statute is rationally related to achieving the legitimate
purpose.
On the opposite end of the spectrum, strict scrutiny of suspect classifi-
cations, which include race,21 alienage, 218 and ancestery,1 9 requires that a
compelling state interest has necessitated the creation and use of the sus-
pect classification and that the interest cannot be served by less severe
alternatives. Thus when a classification is found to trigger strict scrutiny
(because it classifies on the basis of race, alienage, or national origin), the
state must demonstrate that the classification (1) serves a compelling
state interest and (2) was the least drastic alternative available to the
state. If the state fails to meet either of the two parts of the test, the
statute is found unconstitutional. In practice, statutes do not survive
strict scrutiny analysis. Thus, if a plaintiff can trigger strict scrutiny, his
success is virtually assured.
The classification which brought Reed to the attention of the Court was
Idaho's automatic and compulsory preference for males as the adminis-
trators of a deceased person's estate over females even if both were
equally qualified.220 The Court adopted the language of Royster Guano
Co. v. Virginia22" ' and stated, "[a] classification 'must be reasonable, not
arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and
substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons
similarly circumstanced shall be treated allke.' '222 The Court framed the
issue as "whether a difference in the sex of competing applicants . . .
bears a rational relationship to a state objective that is sought to be ad-
vanced .... "22
216. 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955). See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 16-2
(1979) [hereinafter cited as TRIBE].
217. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944).
218. Surgarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365
(1971). But the Court may be retreating from this position. See Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S.
291 (1978).
219. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
220. IDAHO CODE § 15-314 provided that "Of several persons claiming and equally entitled
[under § 15-312] to administer, males must be preferred to females.... .(emphasis
added).
221. 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
222. 404 U.S. at 76.
223. Id. (emphasis added).
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Although the language of the Court seemed to adopt the rational basis
test for the case, the way it applied the test to the facts of the case was
somewhat unusual. The Supreme Court did not hypothesize a legitimate
state purpose to justify the state's classifications, as it regularly does in
rational basis analysis.2 24 Instead, the Court considered only the purpose
advanced by the state itself, that of administrative convenience. The
Court then found-the classification to be arbitrary and the advanced state
purpose to be insufficient to justify the classification.22 5 Thus, the auto-
matic preference for males as administrators of estates was found
unconstitutional.
The standard that the Court had adopted in Reed was not strict scru-
tiny and nothing in the language of the Court would suggest that it was.
Yet the application of the test to the facts of the case was much stronger
than the usually deferential rational basis test. The test for gender classi-
fications was somewhere between the two established levels of review for
equal protection cases, but where or what it was remained unclear.
The next major case that the Court dealt with in relation to gender
classifications did nothing to clarify the state of the law. In Frontiero v.
Richardson,226 servicewoman Frontiero claimed that the government's re-
quirement that she must demonstrate that her spouse was dependent on
her for at least fifty percent of his maintainance before they qualified for
dependents' benefits227 when male personnel need not make such show-
ing,22s was a violation of the fifth amendment's due process clause. The
Court split on the issue and there was no majority opinion in the case.
Frontiero represented the closest that gender classifications have come
to being a suspect category, as four of the Justices, Douglas, White, Mar-
shall, and Brennan, found gender to be a suspect category and applied
224. The Court usually tries to find some set of facts that will justify a classification as
rational and then assume that this was the purpose that the legislature had in mind when it
passed the statute. Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 530 (1959); Lindsley v. Natural
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911). See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483,
487 (1955); TRIBE, supra note 216 at § 16-3.
225. 404 U.S. at 76.
226. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
227. 37 U.S.C. § 401 (1966) provided in part that: "In this chapter, 'dependent,' with
respect to a member of uniformed service means-(1) his spouse .... However, a person is
not a dependent of a female member unless he is in fact dependent on her for over one-half
of his support .... " 10 U.S.C. § 1072(2) provided in part that: "'Dependent' with respect
to a member. . . of a uniformed service means-(a) the wife. . . . (c) the husband, if he is
in fact dependent on the member. . . for over one-half of his support.. "
228. See note 227 supra.
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strict scrutiny to the federal statute.229 These Justices asserted that the
situation of women was "comparable to that of blacks" in that women
had been historically discriminated against by law and by practice,2 0 that
gender classifications violate "the basic concept of our system that legal
burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility,) 23 1
that sex is a distinct characteristic determined by the accident of birth,22
and the characteristic usually has no relationship to capacity or ability,"'
and that Congress also was becoming more sensitive to classifications
based on gender. 3 4 The Justices found the asserted purpose of adminis-
trative convenience less than compelling and thus found that the classifi-
cation was unconstitutional. 23 5
Justice Stewart's concurring opinion resulted in the particular classifi-
cation being stricken, but he very carefully did not adopt gender as a
suspect category.23 6 Instead he found it an invidious discrimination and
thus void on the basis of Reed.3 '
The concurrence of Justice Powell, joined by Justice Blackmun and
Chief Justice Burger, is particularly noteworthy. They concurred in the
result on the basis of Reed, but would not add gender to the list of sus-
pect categories.2 38 Justice Powell stated:
I find compelling reason for deferring a general categorizing of sex classifica-
tions as invoking the strictest test of judicial scrutiny. The Equal Rights
Amendment, which if adopted will resolve the substance of this precise
question, has been approved by the Congress and submitted for ratification
229. 411 U.S. at 682.
230. Id. at 685.
231. Id. at 686, (quoting with approval Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 406 U.S.
164, 175 (1972)).
232. Id. at 686.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 687.
235. Id. at 690.
236. Id. at 691 (Stewart, J., concurring).
237. The term "invidious discrimination" has no exact definition in constitutional inter-
pretation. However, it is usually used to describe a classification which the Court, after ap-
plying the appropriate test (strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or rational basis), has
concluded violates the equal protection clause. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974);
Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1971); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Brown v. Board bf Education of Topeka,
347 U.S. 483 (1954). Thus the term is used to indicate a conclusion of, not a test of uncon-stitutionality. Justice Stewart, however, seems to be applying the term in a new and unclear
way. See text accompanying notes 318-21 infra. Perhaps Justice Stewart's concurrance in
Frontiero was the beginning of this new approach to invidiousness.
238. 411 U.S. at 691 (Powell, J., concurring).
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to the States .... By acting prematurely and unnecessarily, as [I] view it,
the Court has assumed a decisional responsibility at the very time when
state legislatures, functioning within the traditional democratic process, are
debating the proposed Amendment. It seems to me that this reaching out to
pre-empt by judicial action a major political decision which is currently in
the process of resolution does not reflect appropriate respect for duly pre-
scribed legislative processes. 3 9
This strong, straightforward reason may be the simplest explanation of
why the Court did not and has not adopted gender as a suspect category.
It nonetheless left unanswered what type of classification gender repre-
sents, and what level of scrutiny it must withstand.
The next major decision of the Court in this area was of a different
nature. In Kahn v. Shevin,240 the first sex discrimination case brought by
a male, a Florida widower challenged Florida's $500 property tax exemp-
tion for widows only, as an unconstitutional gender classification.24 The
decision of the Court shrouded gender classifications in yet another layer
of confusion. Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas, who has argued in
Frontiero that gender should be a suspect category,2 42 adopted the Reed
test and stated "[tlhere can be no doubt therefore that Florida's differing
treatment of widows and widowers 'rest[s] upon some ground of differ-
ence having a fair and substantial relationship to the object of the legisla-
tion.' ",243 Frontiero was distinguished since in that case the only stated
objective of the state was administrative convenience, while in Shevin
Florida asserted that the purpose was to remedy past employment dis-
crimination against women which had made it more difficult for women
to support themselves.244
Shevin raises the possibility then that gender classifications which are
benign or remedial in purpose will receive a lesser level of scrutiny. Al-
though it may be the intention of the Court to subject benign classifica-
tions only to rational basis review, the Court's opinion does not clearly
establish the intention due to another complicating factor-a state tax
239. Id. at 692.
240. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
241. FLA. STAT. § 196.191(7) (1971) was the statute under which appellant was denied
exemption. The statutes have been renumbered and slightly changed, but the basic sub-
stance of this provision was unchanged. Now FLA. STAT. § 196.202 (Cum. Supp. 1979) pro-
vides that, "[p]roperty to the value of five hundred dollars ($500) of every widow, blind
person, or totally and permanently disabled person who is a bona fide resident of this state
shall be exempt from taxation."
242. 411 U.S. at 682.
243. 416 U.S. at 355 (quoting with approval from Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. at 76).
244. Id.
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regulation was in issue in Shevin, and such regulations have traditionally
received the rational basis level of scrutiny.24
Thus, although the majority were content to apply only a rational basis
test in Shevin, whether it was because of the remedial purpose of the
legislation, or the fact that it was a state regulation, or a combination of
both, remained unclear.
Dissenting, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, made it clear
that part of the Court was willing to apply strict scrutiny to gender classi-
fications regardless of the purpose or nature of the classification. In ap-
plying the strict scrutiny standard, Justice Brennan found the state's as-
serted remedial purpose to be compelling, but found that the means of
accomplishing the goal were not sufficiently narrowly tailored.246 The
statute was "plainly overinclusive, for the $500 property tax exemption
may be obtained by a financially independent hieress as well as by an
unemployed widow with dependent children. '24 7
The Court dealt with its second sex discrimination case brought by a
male in Schlesinger v. Ballard.24 s Ballard had been discharged from the
armed services pursuant to federal statute because he had not been pro-
moted within nine years.249 He challenged the constitutionality of the
statute because women were given thirteen years in which to be promoted
245. See note 241 supra. Traditionally, state tax regulations have received the minimum
rational basis level of scrutiny from the Supreme Court and the Court's opinion made spe-
cific reference to this. Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 359 (1973);
Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. at 528: "We have long held that '[w]here taxation is con-
cerned and no specific federal right, apart from equal protection, is imperiled, the States
have large leeway in making classifications and drawing lines which in their judgment pro-
duce reasonable systems of taxation' . . . . The statute before us is well within those
limits."
246. 416 U.S. at 357 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
247. 416 U.S. at 360. For an excellent explanation of the concepts of over- and underin-
clusiveness, and their application to equal protection analysis, see Tussman & ten Broek,
The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REv. 341 (1949). See also note 303 infra, and
accompanying text.
248. 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
249. 10 U.S.C. § 6382 (1976) provides in part that:
(a) Each officer on the active list of the Navy serving in the grade of lieutenant,
except an officer in the Nurse Corps, and each officer on the active list of the Marine
Corps serving in the grade of captain shall be honorably discharged on June 30 of the
fiscal year in which he is considered as having failed of selection for promotion to the
grade of lieutenant commander or major for the second time ....
(d) This section does not apply to women officers appointed under section 5590 of
this title or to officers designated for limited duty.
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before being discharged.2 50 Five of the Justices found that Congress's in-
tent in allowing this difference was to compensate female personnel for
fewer opportunities to receive promotions, especially their lack of oppor-
tunity for combat duty.251 The classification was deemed reasonable to
achieve this benign purpose.
Again the dissenters, Justices Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, and"mostly' 252 White, argued that gender classifications required a stricter
level of scrutiny than the majority was applying.253 They further pointed
out that there was no evidence that Congress's purpose in passing the
statute had been to compensate women for fewer promotional opportuni-
ties,254 and that no other compelling interest of the state. was served by
the classification.2 5 Therefore the classification was unconstitutional sex
discrimination.
Schlesinger and Shevin together established the trend of the Court to
uphold classifications it found to be benign in purpose and not to allow
men to sue successfully on a discriminatory gender classification theory.
But this comparatively clear trend became clouded in Weinberger v.
Wiesenfield.25 s
In Weinberger, a widower challenged the Social Security Act's
mandatory requirement that the wife and children of a deceased husband
be made the beneficiaries of the husband's benefits under the Act, but
that a deceased wife's beneficiaries be only the children of the mar-
riage.25 7 The husbands were automatically excluded. The majority of the
Court found the provision unconstitutional. The Court found that the
250. 10 U.S.C. § 6401(a) (1976) provides in part that:
Each woman officer on the active list of the Navy, appointed under section 5590 of
this title, who holds a permanent appointment in the grade of lieutenant and each
woman officer on the active list of the Marine Corps who holds a permanent appoint-
ment in the grade of captain shall be honorably discharged on June 30 of the fiscal
year in which-
(1) she is not on a promotion list; and
(2) she has completed 13 years of active commissioned service in the Navy or the
Marine Corps.
251. 419 U.S. at 508.
252. Id. at 521 (White, J., dissenting).
253. Id. at 511 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
254. Id. at 512-19.
255. Id. at 519-21.
256. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
257. 42 U.S.C. § 402(g) (1976) provides in part that: "(1) The widow.., of an individual
who dies a fully or currently insured individual . . .shall . . .be entitled to a mother's
insurance benefit .... " There is no corresponding section or benefit for a widower or
surving divorced father in the act.
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classification was discriminatory as to women stating, "the Constitution
. . . forbids the gender-based differentiation that results in the efforts of
female workers required to pay social security taxes producing less pro-
tection for their families than is produced by the efforts of men. ' 25s
Hence, the decision of the case was based on a theory of sex discrimina-
tion against women, even though the plaintiff was a male alleging dis-
crimination against men by the classification.
The next major point of the opinion was that the purpose alleged by
the government for the classification was rejected by the Court. The gov-
ernment had argued that the provision was to compensate women for the
difficulties they face in supporting themselves and their families.25 This
remedial purpose, which had been found sufficient in Shevin and Schles-
inger, was rejected in Weinberger. The Court found the true purpose of
the provision was to allow children deprived of one parent the attention
of the other parent.26 0 In relation to this purpose then the classification
was "entirely irrational." '261 A father no less than a mother should have
the opportunity for the companionship, care and custody of his chil-
dren.16 2 The widower won his case, but the precedential value for the next
male bringing a sex discrimination suit was severely limited since the
Court had based its opinion on the statute's discriminatory effect on wo-
men as well as men. Furthermore, the Court had rejected the purpose of
the classification asserted by the government, had substituted what it
found to be the true purpose of the classification, and then found this
purpose to be insufficient to withstand the scrutiny of the equal protec-
tion clause.
This same type of analysis was present in Califano v. Goldfarb, s3
where the Court had before it another provision of the Social Security
Act. The provision in question provided benefits automatically to a
widow, but a widower had to establish a minimum of fifty percent depen-
dence on his deceased wife in order to receive benefits.2 The provision
258. 420 U.S. at 645.
259. Id. at 648.
260. Id. at 649.
261. Id. at 651.
262. Id. at 652.
263. 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
264. 42 U.S.C. § 402(f)(1) (1976) provides in part that: "The widower ... of an individual
who dies a fully insured individual, if such widower-(D)(1) was receiving at least one-half
of his support ... from such individual at the time of her death ... shall be entitled to a
widower's insurance benefit ......
Section 402(e)(1) (1976) provides in part that:
The widow of an individual who dies a fully insured individual, if such widow ... (A)
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was held invalid, but the Court could not reach a majority position.
Joined by Justices White, Marshall, and Powell, Justice Brennan found
that the provision discriminated against women, just as in Weinberger,
and rejected the asserted remedial purpose of the classification.265 He
found that the classification came instead from an intention to aid depen-
dent wives of deceased wage-earning husbands and that this intention
was based on the assumption that most wives are dependent. This Justice
Brennan argued was the same situation presented in Frontiero and Wein-
berger.266 "The only conceivable justification for writing the presumption
of wives' dependency into the statute is the assumption... based simply
on 'archaic and overbroad' generalizations that it would save the Govern-
ment time, money, and effort simply to pay benefits. . rather than re-
quire proof of dependency of both sexes."2' 6 7 Thus, as in Frontiero and
Weinberger, they found the classification invalid. It is worth noting that
again the decision was based on discrimination against a female, not a
male, and that the Court rejected the government's asserted purpose,
substituted its own, and found it to be insufficient.
Justice Stevens rejected the view that the classification discriminated
against women and wrote that under the test of equal protection, the pro-
vision was an invalid discrimination against men.268 "I am thereby per-
suaded that this discrimination against a group of males is merely the
accidental by-product of a traditional way of thinking about females." 26 9
Justice Rehnquist's dissent, joined by Justices Stewart and Blackmun,
and Chief Justice Burger, argued that social insurance legislation such as
this should be subjected to a lower level of scrutiny than the other Jus-
tices had applied 270 and that on the basis of Shevin, the Court should
have found that this provision "rest[ed] upon some ground of difference
having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation. '27 1
is not married, (B)(i) has attained age 60 or (ii) has attained age 50 ... and is under
a disability ... (C)(i) has filed application for widow's insurance benefits... and
(D) is not entitled to old-age insurance benefits or is entitled to old-age benefits each
of which is less than the primary insurance amount of such deceased individual, shall
be entitled to a widow's insurance benefit.
The two provisions are identical except for the fact that § 402(f)(1)(D)(1), the showing of
dependence requirement, has no counterpart in § 402(e)(1).
265. 430 U.S. at 206, 216.
266. Id. at 217.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 217 (Stevens, J., concurring).
269. Id. at 223.
270. Id. at 225 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
271. Id. at 226.
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He accepted the Government's asserted purpose of the classification and
thus believed the provision should have been upheld.17 2
The Court seemed to be retreating from any kind of elevated standards
for gender classifications in Geduldig v. Aiello.273 At issue was California's
disability insurance plan which excluded from coverage for benefits any
disabilities resulting from a normal pregnancy.2 7 4 The majority of the
Court found that this was not a gender classification at all.
The program divides potential recipients into two groups-pregnant women
and nonpregnant persons .... Absent a showing that distinctions involving
pregnancy are mere pretexts designed to effect an invidious discrimination
against the members of one sex or the other, lawmakers are constitutionally
free to include or exclude pregnancy from the coverage of legislation such as
this on any reasonable basis, just as with respect to any other physical
condition.2 7 5
272. Id. at 242.
273. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
274. CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 2626 (West, 1972) provided in part that, "in no case shall
the term 'disability' or 'disabled' include any injury or illness caused by or arising in connec-
tion with pregnancy up to the termination of such pregnancy and for a period of 28 days
thereafter."
275. 417 U.S. at 496-97 n.20. Even though the Court's distinction between pregnant and
non-pregnant persons seems to offend common sense, the decision has been followed and
used as valid precedential law in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). There
the Court upheld a private company's policy to exclude coverage in their disabilty plan for
disabilities arising from pregnancy over the plaintiff's claim that the policy violated Title
VII § 703(a)(1) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Reaffirming Geduldig, the Court found the
policy valid but stated that the classification would be invalid "if it were in fact a subterfuge
to accomplish a forbidden discrimination. . . . " Id. at 136.
The Court has found one type of pregnancy policy to be invalid, even if the classification
is not of gender but of pregnant and non-pregnant persons. In Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty,
434 U.S. 136, 139-43 (1977), the Court found that the company's policy of forcing pregnant
persons to take a leave of absence without pay and depriving these employees of all accumu-
lated seniority for such leave of absence was invalid under Title VII § 703(a)(2). The Court
found that although the policy was neutral on its face, its treatment of male and female
employees was in fact discriminatory.
Subsequent to the Court's decisions in Geduldig, Gilbert, and Satty, Congress amended
Title VII so that pregnancy is now a gender classification under Title VII. Section 701(k)
now provides that:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not limited to,
because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions; and
women affected by pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions shall be
treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits
under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their
ability or inability to work. ...
42 U.S.C. 2000(e)(k) (Supp. 1974-78). The amendment became effective October 31, 1978.
It would seem that this time, at least, the Court's refusal to act when action seemed so
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There was no showing by the plaintiff that the classification was a pretext
for discrimination and since the program excluded benefits for all short
term disabilities, the majority concluded that there was a reasonable basis
for such exclusion-lowering the costs of the program . 7  As the Court
stated, "[t]he Equal Protection Clause does not require that a State must
choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the
problem at all. ' 27 7 Thus, the majority applied a rational basis test because
this was a social insurance program and because it found that the exclu-
sion of pregnancy coverage was not a distinction based on sex but a dis-
tinction between pregnant women and nonpregnant persons.
Justice Brennan's dissent, joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall,
found that an exclusion of pregnancy coverage was a classification based
on gender and that the Court's previous decisions in Reed and Frontiero
required a stricter standard of scrutiny than the majority applied here.2 7 8
Even the Justices were becoming weary of the indefiniteness of the gen-
der classification standard by the time they decided Stanton v. Stan-
ton 27 9 in 1975. Here a Utah court had held that a father did not have to
continue child support payments for his daughter after she reached age
eighteen or for his son after he reached age twenty-one.8 0 The difference
in the ages for the children was based upon Utah's law that women at-
tained majority at eighteen and men at twenty-one.2 8 ' The Utah court
based its decision on what it called some "old notions"-that it is gener-
ally the man's primary responsibility to provide a home and support, that
it is thus more important that he obtain an education, and that women
mature faster than men.282 The Supreme Court reversed the decision.
Justice Brennan, speaking for the majority, wrote, "We therefore con-
clude that under any test-compelling state interest or rational basis, or
something in between-[the statute] does not survive an equal protection
clearly called for spurred Congress into action to correct the situation. The result in this
series of cases seems to bear out the predilection of some of the justices for throwing back to
the legislatures issues which they prefer not to handle. See Justice Powell's dissent in Fron-
tiero, note 239 supra; see also notes 46 & 99 supra and accompanying text.
276. 417 U.S. at 495-496.
277. Id. at 495 (quoting with approval from Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 486, 487
(1970)).
278. Id. at 498 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
279. 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
280. 30 Utah 2d 315, 517 P.2d 1010 (1974).
281. UTAH CODE ANN. § 15-2-1 (1953) which provides that "[t]he period of minority ex-
tends in males to the age of twenty-one years and in females to that of eighteen years; but
all minors obtain their majority by marriage."
282. 30 Utah 2d at 319, 517 P.2d at 1012.
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attack. ,283
The latest major gender classification decision of the Court before the
1978-79 Term was Craig v. Boren.2" Bringing a class action for males
between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one, Craig challenged
Oklahoma's statute which forbade the sale of 3.2% beer to males under
the age of twenty-one and females under the age of eighteen.285 The dif-
ference in the ages of males and females was alleged to be an impermissi-
ble gender classification.
Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan stated, "to withstand consti-
tutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender
must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially
related to achievement of those objectives."' ' After thus stating the test,
Justice Brennan found that Oklahoma had not met its burden. The Court
accepted as important Oklahoma's asserted purpose of traffic safety,2 87
but found that the classification was not substantially related to that pur-
pose.2 88 "The State's surveys do not adequately justify the salient fea-
tures of Oklahoma's gender-based traffic safety law. 2' 9 The classification
thus invidiously discriminated against males aged eighteen to twenty-one.
Justice Powell's concurrence was particularly instructive. After stating
that the Court does apply a more critical look to gender classifications
than it does where no fundamental rights or suspect categories are in-
volved,290 he commented in a footnote that
[a]s has been true of Reed and its progeny, our decision today will be
283. 421 U.S. at 17.
284. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
285. OKL. STAT. tit. 37, §§ 241, 245 (1958 and Supp. 1976) provide that:
§ 241: It shall be unlawful for any person who holds a license to sell and dispense beer
... to sell, barter or give to any minor any beverage containing more than one-half of
one percent of alcohol measured by volume and not more than three and two tenths
(3.2) percent of alcohol measured by weight. § 245: A "minor," for the purpose of
Section. . . 241... is defined as a female under the age of eighteen (18) years, and a
male under the age of twenty-one (21) years.
286. 429 U.S. at 197.
287. Id. at 199-200.
288. Id. at 204.
289. Id. at 202-03. In noting that Oklahoma's surveys were inadequate to support the
classification, Justice Brennan stated, "[b]ut this merely illustrates that proving broad soci-
ological propositions by statistics is a dubious business, and one that inevitably is in tension
with the normative philosophy that underlies the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 204.
However, compare this statement with the Court's reliance on statistics for their opinions in
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 635 (1975);
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
290. 429 U.S. at 210 (Powell, J., concurring).
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viewed by some as a "middle-tier" approach. While I would not endorse
that characterization and would not welcome a further subdivision of equal
protection analysis, candor compels the recognition that the relatively def-
erential "rational basis" standard of review normally applied takes on a
sharper focus when we address a gender-based classification.29 1
Justice Stevens concurred in the result but specifically rejected the idea
of adding another level of scrutiny to equal protection analysis.2 2 He
even rejected a double standard of review stating that "there is only one
Equal Protection Clause. '293 The proper question in equal protection
analysis is whether or not persons similarfy situated with reference to the
law are similarly treated.29 4 He found in this case that they were not.
In dissent, Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger, wrote
that there was no basis for applying an elevated standard of review to
gender classifications since neither the Constitution nor previous cases
compelled it.295 The test to be applied is the minimal "rational basis" test
as established in McGowan v. Maryland.296 Under such analysis,
Oklahoma's statute would be permissible. "The only redeeming feature of
the Court's opinion . . . is that it apparently signals a retreat by those
who joined the plurality opinion in Frontiero v. Richardson, from their
view that sex is a 'suspect' classification for purposes of equal protection
analysis.1297
The Court's opinion in Craig was very important for clarifying the
standard that at least a slim majority of the Court would apply to a gen-
der classification. It also marked the first time that a male had success-
fully challenged a gender-based classification and clearly won on the dis-
crimination issue as applied to men. There was no discussion in the
majority opinion as to whether the statute discriminated against women
as well as men. It was apparently this precise point that bothered the
dissenters. "[B]efore today no decision of this Court has applied an ele-
vated level of scrutiny to invalidate a statutory discrimination harmful to
males, except where the statute impaired an important personal interest
protected by the Constitution. 298
291. Id. at 211 n.24.
292. Id. at 212 (Stevens, J., concurring).
293. Id. at 211-12.
294. See 430 U.S. at 219 (Stevens, J., concurring).
295. 429 U.S. at 217 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
296. Id. at 217-18; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Williamson v. Lee Optical
Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
297. 429 U.S. at 217.
298. Id. at 219.
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Thus, before the 1978-79 Term, the standard for a slim majority of the
Court in sex discrimination cases was that the classification must serve
important state objectives and be substantially related to achieving those
objectives. This standard is not strict scrutiny, nor is it the traditional
rational basis test. It is somewhere in between.
B. Substantive Decisions in the 1978-79 Term
During the 1978-79 Supreme Court Term there were five cases dealing
with sex discrimination which were ruled upon substantively by the
Court. 9 All of these cases involved challenges under the fourteenth
amendment's equal protection clause. Although in two of the cases the
Court tested the statutes involved by the standard established in Craig,
the other three decisions evidenced some novel approaches to sex dis-
crimination cases.
1. Orr v. Orr
In Orr v. Orr3 0 0 the Supreme Court declared an Alabama statute uncon-
stitutional under the fourteenth amendment. Under this statute, the Ala-
bama court could require husbands but not wives to pay alimony, thus
prompting Orr, a male, to challenge the statute.
Before turning to the substantive issues, the Court first addressed the
plaintiff's standing to bring the case. Since Orr did not claim that he him-
self, through need, was entitled to alimony, he would not benefit from
state remedial action extending alimony rights to needy husbands. There-
fore Orr would lack standing to challenge the statute because a "proper
plaintiff" would need to request alimony for himself.30 1
On the other hand, if the state should remedy the statute by denying
benefits to either party, Orr would clearly benefit because he would not
be required to pay alimony. Thus the state could redefine the classifica-
tion so as to exclude Orr's wife from, or to include Orr in, alimony pay-
ments, so long as the classification is gender-neutral."0 '
299. An additional case ruled upon by the Court was Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357
(1979). The dissent, written by Justice Rehnquist, insisted that "the majority is in truth
concerned with the equal protection rights of women to participate in the judicial process
rather than with the Sixth Amendment right" to a jury trial, even though the majority
opinion was based solely upon sixth amendment rationale. Id. at 371.
300. 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
301. Id. at 271-72.
302. See Craig v. Born, 429 U.S. 190, 210 n.24 (1976) and Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7,
17-18 (1975), both of which assert the right of the state, rather than the Court, to redefine
the discriminatory classification.
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This inherent problem in underinclusive statutes will not be manipu-
lated by the Court to deny a plaintiff standing.303 Since Orr could possi-
bly benefit, the standing requirement was met; Orr had "alleged such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure concrete
adverseness." 30' The Court went on to state, "There is no question but
that Mr. Orr bears a burden that he would not bear were he female ....
The burden alone is sufficient to establish standing." 30 5 The majority view
is clear. If a discriminatory statute can be rectified so that the plaintiff
would be concretely affected, he will not be denied standing simply be-
cause an alternative means of rectification is available.306
Turning then to the substantive issues, the Court held that the statute
triggered a heightened level of scrutiny because it classified on the basis
of sex. The test the Court used to determine the statute's validity under
the Constitution was that of intermediate scrutiny in that, "classifications
by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be
substantially related to achievement of those objectives. 307 Satisfied to
follow in the steps of Reed, Webster, and Craig the Court continued to
apply an intermediate level of scrutiny to cases dealing with sex
discrimination.
The fact that the classification discriminated against men rather than
women did not affect the level of scrutiny employed. This approach was
consistent with Craig and further established the right of the male to sue
under the equal protection clause.
The Court proceeded to examine the governmental objectives as ex-
pounded by counsel for the state of Alabama. The first of three stated
objectives was to "effectively announc[e] . .. the State's preference for
an allocation of family responsibilities under which the wife plays a de-
303. 440 U.S. at 272.
304. Id., citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
305. 440 U.S. at 273.
306. Justice Rehnquist wrote a dissenting view on the standing issue and stated, "The
Court holds that Alabama's alimony statutes may be challenged in this court by a divorced
male who has never sought alimony [and] who is demonstrably not entitled to alimony even
if he had." Id. at 290. Mr. Orr's standing was based on the possibility that the state could
rectify the unconstitutional statute by doing away with alimony altogether. Justice Rehn-
quist does not consider this alternative as likely enough even to be considered; surely Ala-
bama will not take away alimony from the many women in the state dependent on it. If this
alternative is, as a practical matter, non-existent, the only other alternative is extending
alimony to husbands in need, thus rendering Orr unqualified for alimony. The issue raised
by Mr. Orr is thereby rendered purely hypothetical. Id. at 296.
307. Id. at 279, (citing with approval Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 316-17 (1977)).
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pendant role."3 °8 Without hesitation, the Court denounced this objective
as insufficient, stating that, "the 'old notion' that 'generally it is the
man's primary responsibility to provide a home and its essentials,' can no
longer justify a statute that discriminates on the basis of gender."309 This
statement further entrenches the principles set forth in Stanton and
Goldfarb in that the Court will not accept outmoded concepts of gender
roles to validate a sex discriminatory statute.
The second objective which the Court identified was a "legislative pur-
pose to provide help for needy spouses, using sex as a proxy for need."33 0
In evaluating this objective, the Court found that providing help for
needy spouses was indeed an important governmental objective. However,
the Court never reached a conclusion as to whether sex was a reliable
proxy for determining need. The Alabama statutory scheme already pro-
vided a hearing to determine whether the relative financial status of the
parties warranted awarding alimony to the wife. Since a hearing was al-
ready held, it could be determined at that point whether either spouse,
male or female, was in need of support. Thus, a sweeping generalization
which automatically classified women as needy and men as not was un-
necessary, and thus could not survive the Court's scrutiny.3 1'
A distinction may be drawn between Orr and the previous cases of
Shevin, Schlesinger and Weinberger, although all of these cases involved
the question of whether sex was a reliable proxy for establishing need. In
contrast to previous cases decided by the Court, a hearing was already
held in Orr. Thus, the decision in Orr applies only to such limited situa-
tions where a hearing to determine need is already required. Statutes
which do not already provide for a hearing to determine need will still be
evaluated in light of Shevin, Goldfarb, and Weinberger. Under these de-
cisions, the first test will be whether the proxy is accurate. If the classifi-
cation is not a reliable proxy, then the statute will be held invalid. If the
proxy is accurate, the state must further prove that the classification is
substantially related to an important governmental purpose. Neither task
will be easy since, as it did in Goldfarb and Weinberger, the Court may
reject the asserted purpose of the state if it decides that the statute is in
reality based upon a stereotypical view of a certain gender's position in
society.
The third objective of the state was that of "compensating women for
308. 440 U.S. at 280.
309. Id., citing with approval Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 10 (1975).
310. 440 U.S. at 280.
311. Id. at 282-83.
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past discrimination during marriage, which assertedly has left them un-
prepared to fend for themselves in the working world following di-
vorce. ' 312 Using the same reasoning as it applied in testing the second
objective, the Court found that economic compensation for past injustices
was an important governmental objective. Here, too, however, the Court
did not reach a conclusion as to whether women had indeed been left
disadvantaged by past legislation. Instead, it was noted that the individu-
alized hearing already provided by Alabama's statute could provide a fo-
rum where it would be determined whether each particular woman has
been discriminated against in the marital relationship. Thus, the Court
concluded, "[w]here, as here, the State's compensatory and ameliorative
purposes are as well served by a gender-neutral classification as one that
gender-classifies, and therefore [the gender-based classification] carries
with it the baggage of sexual stereotypes, the State cannot be permitted
to classify on the basis of sex." 313 Thus, the Court did not rule out ame-
liorative sex based statutes entirely. Arguably, the Court could continue
either to validate remedial statutes which classified on the basis of sex, or
at least apply a lower level of scrutiny in assessing their validity. This
approach would be consistent with Shevin and Schlesinger. Justice
Blackmun's concurrence was based on this very assumption-that the de-
cision would impose no limitations on Shevin3 1 4
The Court in dicta, however, warned that such classifications on the
basis of sex "carry the inherent risk of reinforcing stereotypes . . . [and
thus] must be carefully tailored. '315 This indicates that the Court is fol-
lowing its decisions in Weinberger and Goldfarb in that it will refuse to
accept a state's assertedly ameliorative purpose when it believes that the
purpose is in actuality a reinforcement of a stereotypical image.
2. Parham v. Hughes
In Parham v. Hughes,3 1  the Supreme Court was faced with a Georgia
statute31 7 which allowed the natural mother of an illegitimate child to sue
for that child's wrongful death, or, if the mother was dead, allowed the
father who had legitimated the child to sue. A father who had not legiti-
mated his child, however, was precluded under the statute from bringing
an action for the wrongful death of his illegitimate child. The question
312. Id. at 280.
313. Id. at 283.
314. Id. at 284 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
315. Id. at 283.
316. 441 U.S. 347 (1979).
317. GA. CODE § 105-1307 (1968) (Repealed April 4, 1979).
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presented to the Court was whether this statute violated the equal pro-
tection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment by denying
a father, and not a mother, the right to sue for the death of their illegiti-
mate child solely on the basis of the parent's sex. In a split decision, the
Court decided that the statute did not violate either clause.
The plurality opinion, written by Justice Stewart, presented a unique
approach to equal protection challenges. Justice Stewart establishes a test
never before used by the Court in assessing discrimination claims, and
thus deserving of special consideration. He began by stating that "[s]tate
laws are generally entitled to a presumption of validity." 18 He continued,
however, to note that not all laws are entitled to that presumption s.3 1 The
determining factor is whether the discrimination is "invidious." If the
statute is not invidious, then it is entitled to the presumption of validity
unless the Court can find "no rational relationship to a permissable state
objective. 3 20
Thus, Justice Stewart's new approach hinges on proof that the statute
is "invidious." The word, invidious, appears to assume a novel meaning.
Earlier opinions used the word in a broad sense to denote a conclusion.
When the classification was found to be in violation of constitutional
guarantees, then it was labeled invidious.3 2 1 Contrary to this prior usage,
Justice Stewart seemed to create a new definition which serves as a test
rather than a conclusion.
The true import of the meaning of invidiousness is gleaned from Jus-
tice Stewart's entire opinion, and not from one lucid definition. In distin-
guishing Reed, Stanton, Frontiero, and Craig, he found that, "underlying
these decisions is the principle that a State is not free to make overbroad
generalizations based on sex which are entirely unrelated to any differ-
ences between men and women or which demean the ability or social sta-
tus of the affected class. 3 22 Justice Stewart continued to point out differ-
ences in these prior cases in that the statutes were overbroad and treated
classes differently even though they were similarly situated with respect
to the law. In contrast then, he found that men and women were not
similarly situated in this case. This finding stemmed from the fact that
under another Georgia statute only the father could legitimate a child.
318. 441 U.S. at 351.
319. Classifications based upon race present one such exception since they are inherently
suspect. Other classifications, including illegitimacy, alienage and gender, may also rebut
such a presumption of validity. Id.
320. Id.
321. See note 237 supra.
322. 441 U.S. at 351.
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Thus, Justice Stewart wrote that "the statutory classification does not
discriminate against fathers as a class but instead distinguishes between
fathers who have legitimated their children and those who have not. ' 323
Therefore, the statute is not overbroad because there are genuine differ-
ences between the status of men and women under the law. Thus, the key
to proving invidiousness is that the statute be "premised upon overbroad
generalizations and . . . [exclude] all members of one sex even though
they . . . [are] similarly situated with members of the other sex. '3 24
Having found that the statute was not invidiously discriminatory, the
statute was presumed valid. The only qualification to this presumption
now is that a statute must be rationally related to a permissible state
objective-an application of the test used in the first sex discrimination
cases. 325
A variance in interpretation may arise in reading Justice Stewart's
opinion. He initially stated that certain classifications, gender included,
may rebut the presumption of validity given to statutes. His next para-
graph however begins with the statement that "[iun the absence of invidi-
ous discrimination . . . , a court is not free under the aegis of the Equal
Protection Clause to substitute iWjudgment for the will of the people of a
State as expressed in the laws passed by their popularly elected legisla-
tures. '326 This may be interpreted to imply that only those enumerated
classifications are invidious. Furthermore, since Justice Stewart wrote
that the distinction made by the statute was between fathers who had
legitimated their children and those who had not, it may be that he does
not see this as a gender classification at all. Since the classification was
not based on gender, then it was not invidious.32 7
The more likely interpretation is that Justice Stewart viewed this stat-
ute as gender based, but not as one which "invidiously discriminate[d]
against the appellant simply because he is of the male sex." 328 The stat-
ute is gender related but not overbroad because "[t]he fact is that
mothers and fathers of illegitimate children are not similarly situated.' 3 2s
323. Id. at 356.
324. Id. at 356-57.
325. Id. at 357.
326. Id. at 351.
327. This reasoning is similar to that used in Geduldig when a clasification based on preg-
nancy was held not to be a gender classification. Perhaps the reasoning used by Justice
Stewart in establishing a test of invidiousness was intended to satisfy those who criticized
his distinction in Geduldig.
328. 441 U.S. at 356-57 (emphasis added).
329. Id. at 355.
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The distinction, therefore, is that this was not a classification based
merely on gender, but was limited to a more narrow class of fathers who
could have legitimated their children, but did not. Thus, the statute was
not overbroad, and not invidious, because it qualified the gender classifi-
cation and only affected a subset of fathers with a particular
characteristic.
Having thus disposed of the appellant's claim under the equal protec-
tion clause, Justice Stewart quickly dismissed the claim under the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment,330 because appellant did not
sufficiently present his claim."31
Justice Stewart never discussed what the result would be if the statute
in question was found to be invidious. It may be implied from his discus-
sion of Reed and Frontiero that if invidiousness had been found, the stat-
ute would have automatically been deemed to be invalid. It will be seen
from a subsequent case, however, that this is not entirely clear.
It is important to note that this was only a plurality opinion, joined by
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and Stevens, but it was Jus-
tice Powell's concurrence which tipped the scales in the favor of the
state.332 Justice Powell agreed with the outcome, but disagreed with the
plurality's reasoning. He used the Craig test to find that the statute was
substantially related to the important state interest of avoiding problems
of proving paternity.333
The dissent, written by Justice White and joined by Justices Marshall,
Brennan and Blackmun, also used the Craig test to determine whether
the statute violated the fourteenth amendment. Justice White reached a
contrary conclusion, however, and would have held that the statute vio-
lated the constitutional guarantee of equal protection .33 4 Thus, it is im-
portant to note that the majority of the Court continued to use the Craig
test to assess equal protection claims.
330. Id. at 358-59. The Court also distinguished Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1971),
by noting that the present case involved merely an action for money damages, whereas
Stanley involved child custody.
331. 441 U.S. at 358-59.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. In balancing the interests of the state against those of the father, the dissent could
not conceive of any interest which would justify the sex discriminatory statute. Id. at 368.
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3. Caban v. Mohammed
Caban v. Mohammed,33 5 was decided the same day as Parham and once
again involved the father of an illegitimate child. A New York statute3 6
permitted an unwed mother, but not an unwed father to prevent the
adoption of her child by refusing to give her consent to such adoption.
The appellant, an unwed father who wished to block his illegitimate
child's adoption, attacked this statute on equal protection and due pro-
cess grounds and alleged that the statute discriminated against him be-
cause of his sex. 33 7
The Court, in a majority opinion by Justice Powell, tested the statute's
validity by the test expressed in Craig, that "[g]ender based distinctions'must serve governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives' in order to withstand judicial scrutiny
under the Equal Protection Clause. 338 Accordingly, Justice Powell stated
simply that there was no broad distinction between the mother and fa-
ther of a child at every stage of development which would warrant such a
difference in treatment. Thus, the Court rejected the state's presumption
that the sexes were not similarly situated, and that this difference would
provide a basis for the dissimilar treatment by the statute. This careful
assessment of a state's objectives and the subsequent rejection of those
stated objectives is the same reasoning used by the Court in Orr,
Goldberg and Weinberger.
Next, the state argued that this gender-based distinction was substan-
tially related to the best interests of the illegitimate child in furthering
his adoption. The Court recognized that providing for the child's best in-
terests was an important government objective. Nevertheless, the distinc-
tion between sexes, as provided for in the statute, was not substantially
related to this goal because it could not be shown that unwed fathers
were more likely to block adoption proceedings than were unwed
mothers. In conclusion, the Court stated that this statute was overbroad
in assuming that all unwed fathers were "invariably less qualified and
entitled than mothers to exercise a concerned judgment as to the fate of
their children. '339 Thus the statute could not pass muster and was invali-
dated by the Court.
Four Justices dissented. Justice Stewart, writing only for himself, be-
335. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
336. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW (MCIMNNEY) § 111 (1977).
337. 441 U.S. at 381-82.
338. 429 U.S. 190 (1977) cited with approval in 441 U.S. at 388.
339. 441 U.S. at 394.
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lieved the majority had given too little credence to the importance of the
child's future, as aided by adoption. He used the same test of invidious-
ness as applied in Parham and argued that, "[w]hen men and women are
not in fact similarly situated in the area covered by the legislation in
question, the Equal Protection Clause is not violated," and, in his opin-
ion, mothers and fathers were not similarly situated. Fathers were often"unknown, unavailable or simply uninterested."3 40 An unwed mother,
however, had legal custody of the child and it was she who decided
whether or not to give birth to that child. Justice Stewart recognized,
however, that in this particular case, the father was a known and caring
parent, and thus the statute worked an invidious discrimination against
him. Instead of continuing in his explanation as to what the next step
would be once a statute is determined to be invidious, and thus clarifying
his decision in Parham, Justice Stewart simply wrote that he would agree
with the reasoning used by Justice Stevens in his dissent.8 4'
Justice Stevens' dissent was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Rehnquist. They also recognized the compelling 42 interest of the state in
facilitating adoption, and viewed the gender-based distinctions as justi-
fied because the parties were not similarly situated. Justice Stevens went
a step further, however, by stating that if the statute was justified in its
most frequent application, then a presumption of validity should arise.
To invalidate the statute, then, the challenger should be required to show
that it was unjust in a sufficient number of cases to mandate a finding of
invalidity.343
If read in light of Justice Stevens' opinion then, the test of invidious-
ness as established in Parham and advanced in Caban would present an
awesome barrier to a challenge unddr the equal protection clause. Its rea-
soning would be somewhat circular and would read as follows: if the stat-
ute were overbroad and treated members of a class differently even
though they were similarly situated, then it would be invidious discrimi-
nation. This would not automatically invalidate a statute though, and the
challenger would have to show that its application was invidious in a suf-
ficient number of cases so as to require its invalidation. Conversely, if the
statute was not overbroad, then it would only be necessary to show that it
was rationally related to a permissible state objective.
340. Id. at 398.
341. Id. at 401.
342. Justice Stevens distinguished his use of the word "compelling" from those cases
where strict scrutiny required that an interest be compelling. Id. at 402-03 n.3.
343. Id. at 410-12. Furthermore, both the majority and dissenting Justices would not ex-
tend this holding to cases where the child was a newborn infant. Id. at 392 n.11, 407.
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Thus Caban and Parham, decisions handed down on the same day,
reached conflicting conclusions in cases which were very similar. Justice
Stewart attempted to draw a distinction between the cases by explaining
that in Parham the father could remove himself from the classification,
whereas in Caban he could not.344 The real reason for the varying conclu-
sions, however, stemmed from the split in the Court. Four Justices, led by
Justice Stewart, follow the newly defined invidousness test. Five other
Justices apply the Craig test. The difference in outcomes was caused by
Justice Powell's voting switch. While using the Craig test in both in-
stances, he arrived at opposite conclusions as to the tailoring of the stat-
ute to meet governmental goals. Thus, at this point, it seemed that equal
protection cases were subject to a split approach by the Court, with Jus-
tice Powell's assessment of the state's goal being the deciding factor.
4. Personnel Administration of Massachusetts v. Feeney
The challenge in Personnel Administration of Massachusetts v. Fee-
ney345 was to an absolute veterans preference mandated by Massachusetts
law.3 46 The appellee, a woman, had attempted to advance through the
civil service system of Massachusetts. She took several qualifying tests,
and although always scoring near the top, was never certified for the ad-
vanced positions, since Massachusetts law gave an absolute lifetime pref-
erence to veterans. Feeney brought an action challenging the constitu-
tionality of the statute under the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. She alleged that the disproportionate impact of
the statute worked a discrimination against women. The state appealed
the district court's judgment which had declared the statute unconstitu-
tional, and the Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision. 47
In establishing a background for its decision, the Court first examined
the evolution of the veteran's preference in Massachusetts law. The justi-
fication for such a preference was found to be "to reward veterans for the
sacrifice of military service, to ease the transition from military to civilian
life, to encourage patriotic service, and to attract loyal and well-disci-
plined people to civil service occupations. '3 4 8 Since the initial passage of
such a statute in 1896, the language employed was technically, although
perhaps not realistically, gender-neutral. The Court also noted the severe
disproportionate impact which the statute had upon women's employ-
344. Id. at 390 n.9.
345. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
346. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 31 § 23 (1977).
347. 442 U.S. at 259.
348. Id. at 265.
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ment opportunities in the public sector. 49
Keeping this background in mind, Justice Stewart, in writing the ma-
jority opinion, recognized that, "[a]lthough public employment is not a
constitutional right. . . any state law overtly or covertly designed to pre-
fer males over females in public employment would require an exceed-
ingly persuasive justification to withstand a constitutional challenge
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."35 0
Noting that the statute was not discriminatory on its face, but was chal-
lenged because of its discriminatory effects, the Court established a two-
step test of validity for such a situation. First, it had to be determined
whether the statute was indeed neutral. Secondly, the Court would look
to see if "the adverse effect reflects invidious gender-based discrimina-
tion." '' They key to this test, according to Justice Stewart, was not
merely that the impact should be severe, but that the purposeful discrim-
inatory intent must have been present.35 2
This approach to a statute, challenged because of its disproportionate
impact upon a certain group, is consistent with the Court's decision in
Washington v. Davis.53 Faced with a regulation which disproportionately
affected employment opportunities for blacks, the Court in Washington
held that the impact must be accompanied by a discriminatory purpose
in order to violate the fourteenth amendment.
The Court found no problem in deciding that the first step was satis-
fied in that, "the legitimate noninvidious purposes . . . [of the statute]
cannot be missed."3 ' Supporting this proposition was the fact that a sub-
stantial number of males were also adversely affected by a veteran's pref-
erence. Thus, the statute was not merely a pretext for preferring men
over women.3 55
The Court then proceeded to determine whether the statute was invidi-
ous on a disproportionate impact theory. The test for invidiousness varied
from that used by Justice Stewart in Parham because, unlike Parham,
349. Id. at 270-71.
350. Id. at 273.
351. Id. at 274. Justice Stevens probably made a valid point in his concurring opinion
when he stated, "I am inclined to believe the question whether [the classification] is covertly
gender-based is the same as the question whether its adverse effects reflect invidious gen-
der-based discrimination." Id. at 281.
352. Id. at 274.
353. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan House.
Dev. Corp. 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
354. 442 U.S. at 278-80.
355. Id.
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the statute was facially neutral. Justice Stewart, however, continued to
couch the test for disproportionate impact as invidiousness. He at-
tempted to expand the use of his test to an area historically given unique
treatment.
Justice Stewart established two requirements for a statute to be invidi-
ous. First, the effect on one group needed to be disproportionate. Second,
the disproportionate impact had to be caused by a discriminatory intent.
So, although he used the terminology of invidiousness, Justice Stewart
nonetheless applied the same test established in Washington.
The real question, then, focused on the intent of the legislature in en-
acting the statute. The plaintiff argued that several factors contributed to
a finding that the discrimination was purposeful. First, the statute was
based upon a qualification, veteran status, historically reserved to men
under gender-biased policies of the military. Secondly, the disproportion-
ate impact upon women was too obviously inevitable to be unintended.
Lastly, it was argued that the preference has very little to do with em-
ployment capabilities.35 8
The Court rejected these arguments although recognizing that "[t]o the
extent that the status of veteran is one that few women have been ena-
bled to achieve, every hiring preference for veterans, however modest or
extreme, is inherently gender-biased. 35 7 Nevertheless, these gender-bi-
ased policies of the military did not convince the Court that the required
discriminatory intent was present. The Court noted that "the history of
discrimination against women in the military is not on trial in this
case." 358 And, the Court stated, if there was such a discriminatory pur-
pose, the plaintiff should not have argued that a less stringent preference
would be legitimate, since any discriminatory purpose would invalidate
such a preference in its entirety.359
The Court also recognized that "it would be disingenuous to say that
the adverse consequences of this legislation for women were unintended,
in the sense that they were not volitional or in the sense that they were
not foreseeable," however "purpose implies more than intent as volition
or intent as awareness of consequences. 3 60 Instead, the legislature must
have "selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part
'because of,' not merely 'inspite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifi-
356. Id.
357. Id. at 276-77.
358. Id. at 278.
359. Id. at 276.
360. Id. at 278-79.
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able group," e3 6' and the history of this statute discredited any claim of
such a purpose. This definition of discriminatory purpose is important
because it clears up areas left cloudy after Washington. No longer could
discriminatory purpose be established by showing foreseeable impact.
The test would now be whether the action was taken partially "because
of" its disproportionate impact. This test, as the dissent notede36 2 will be
difficult to meet.
A vigorous dissent was written by Justice Marshall, joined by Justice
Brennan. They rejected the majority's conclusion that because the vet-
eran's preference was based on one valid purpose, it could not have a
discriminatory purpose as well. Instead, Justice Marshall contended that
"[w]here the foreseeable impact of a facially neutral policy is so dispro-
portionate, the burden should rest on the State to establish that sex-
based considerations played no part in the choice of the particular legisla-
tive scheme." '63 The opinion recognized that "[a]bsent an omniscience
not commonly attributed to the judiciary, it will often be impossible to
ascertain the sole or even dominant purpose of a given statute."36' In
light of this reality, Justice Marshall argued that "since reliable evidence
of subjective intentions is seldom obtainable, resort to inference based on
objective factors is generally unavoidable."36 5 The dissent found that the
legislative history indicated an awareness of the impact the statute would
have on women, and that the legislature chose to mitigate those effects
only with respect to traditionally female jobs. Thus, Justice Marshall con-
cluded: "Such a statutory scheme both reflects and perpetuates precisely
the kind of archaic assumptions about women's roles which we have pre-
viously held invalid."366
Since a discriminatory purpose was found, Justice Marshall examined
whether the statute was substantially related to an important state inter-
361. Id. at 279.
362. Id. Justice Stewart came short of declaring foreseeable impact completely irrelevant
in -establishing discriminatory purpose. The inevitability that a certain action will have a
discriminatory effect may create an inference that there was a discriminatory purpose mo-
tivationg that action. According to Justice Stewart, in this case, "the inference simply fails
to ripen into proof." Id. at 279 n.25.
363. Id. at 284. Note however, that in Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. 252, 270-71 n.21 (1977),
dicta indicated that when it was proven that discriminatory purpose was at least part of the
motivation for an action, the burden shifted to the state to show that, "the same decision
would have resulted even had the impermissable purpose not been considered." In a sepa-
rate opinion, Justice Marshall, id. at 271, would require the state to shoulder a higher bur-
den of proof and show that no impermissable purpose was a factor in the decision.
364. 442 U.S. at 282.
365. Id. at 283.
366. Id. at 285.
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est. He found that the statute was not substantially related to the stated
objectives, and thus, believed the preference to be unconstitutional.3 67
5. Califano v. Westcott
The last sex discrimination case heard by the Supreme Court in the
1978-79 term, Califano v. Westcott,65 closely followed Orr in using the
Craig standard to test the validity of a statute challenged under the equal
protection clause. 69 Although previously split between the Craig test and
Justice Stewart's new test for sex discrimination cases, the Court united
and applied the Craig test unanimously.
The suit was brought by a woman who asserted that section 407 of the
Social Security Act violated the fourteenth amendment by denying her
benefits solely because of her sex. The statute allowed children with un-
employed fathers to receive benefits which would ensure the children the
basic necessities. If the mother was unemployed however, the children did
not qualify for those benefits. The district court declared this statute un-
constitutional, and an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court.3 7 0
The government first argued that the statute did not, in fact, classify
by gender. Instead, the classification was that of whole families, and its
effect was felt not only by the mother, but also by the father and chil-
dren. The Court rejected this argument based upon precedent371 which
struck down "gender classifications that result in benefits being granted
or denied to family units on the basis of the sex of the qualifying
parent." 37 2
The government attempted to distinguish the precedent of Frontiero,
Goldfarb and Weinberger by asserting that the accomplishments of wo-
men were not denigrated here, as they were in the previous cases. Instead,
the source of the benefits was a welfare program supported by the reve-
nues of the state. The Court recognized that "[t]he distinction between
employment-related benefits and other forms of government largesse may
be relevant to equal protection analysis," but that it was nevertheless a
"discredited view that welfare benefits are a 'privilege' not subject to the
367. Id. at 288.
368. 99 S. Ct. 2655 (1979).
369. The challenge was based on a violation of the fifth amendment, since a federal stat-
ute was involved. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
370. 99 S. Ct. at 2657.
371. See, e.g., Califano v. Goldbarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420
U.S. 636 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
372. 99 S. Ct. at 2660.
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guarantee of equal protection. '8 78 Furthermore, the presumption which
the statute was based upon posed an absolute barrier to the plaintiff's
qualification, and was not merely procedural in nature. Thus, the depri-
vation of subsistance benefits was also absolute and so all the more
onerous.8 74
Next, the government argued that the statute was substantially related
to important state objectives, and offered two objectives to support this
theory. First, that the statute was designed to aid children who were in
need because of a parent's unemployment. The Court quickly rejected
this argument. Although it thought the state objective was important, it
found no evidence that the gender distinctions in this statute were sub-
stantially related to the achievement of that particular end. The Court
looked to legislative history in attempting to find some purpose which the
distinction could serve. What they found however, was merely an intent
to aid needy children. The Court could find no evidence, nor was any
asserted, that showed gender distinctions served this goal. 37 5
Secondly, the government argued that the goal of the statute was to
remedy a flaw in the original provision which had provided assistance for
dependent children only when a parent was absent. This caused the fa-
ther to leave the home in order to receive assistance, thereby breaking up
the family unit. To remedy this effect, the statute was amended to apply
to those families where the father was unemployed, instead of absent.
The Court found two problems with this reasoning. First, the original
statutes were gender-neutral. Again, the Court inspected the history of
the amendment. It looked to determine whether the change to a gender-
based statute was intended to remedy the original provision's flaw in in-
ducing desertion. To the contrary, the Court found that the gender limi-
tation was instead tied to a reduction in program costs. 876 Secondly, there
was no evidence to support the proposition that the father was more
likely to desert than the mother in cases where the mother was the princi-
pal wage-earner. Instead, the Court found that the statute was based
upon old notions that the father was the bread winner, and thus this on-
erous stereotype could not be tolerated. The Court concluded then, that
"[l]egislation that rests on such presumptions, without more, cannot sur-
vive scrutiny under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.' 7 7
373. Id. at 2661. Contra, Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
374. 99 S. Ct. at 2661.
375. The Court rejected the "one step at a time" approach taken in Geduldig. See notes
273-83 supra and accompanying text.
376. 99 S. Ct. at 2662.
377. Id. at 2663.
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Thus, Westcott continued to use the intermediate level of scrutiny es-
tablished in Craig and reaffirmed in Orr. Why the four Justices who had
used the test of invidiousness did not continue to use that test is left to
speculation since no concurring opinion addressed this issue.
C. Conclusion
The 1978-79 Supreme Court Term raised major new questions about
sex discrimination analysis as well as settling some old questions from
previous terms. Perhaps the most definite statement that can be made
about judicial treatment of gender classifications is that it will not receive
strict scrutiny, even from the four Justices who originally found gender to
be a suspect classification in Frontiero.
The clear test for at least five of the Justices (Powell, Brennan, Mar-
shall, Blackmun and White) is now the test announced by the Court in
Craig. To survive equal protection analysis, a gender classification must
serve an important state interest and be tailored to relate substantially to
that interest. Failure to meet either of these two requirements results in a
finding of unconstitutionality.
The position of the remaining four Justices (Stevens, Stewart, Rehn-
quist and Burger) on gender clasifications is less certain. At times they
join with the majority of the Court and apply the Craig test, as in Orr
and Westcott. At other times, they retreat from this intermediate scru-
tiny to a more deferential though very uncertain standard-that verbal-
ized by Justice Stewart as "invidious discrimination." Although these
words have traditionally been used to indicate a conclusion of unconstitu-
tionality, Justice Stewart's opinions this term may indicate that invidious
dicrimination is a test to be applied to find unconstitutional gender clas-
sifications. This is perhaps his test for all classifications challenged as
constitutionally invalid under the equal protection clause. Even if this is
the beginning of a new type of analysis, its paremeters are, at best, uncer-
tain and its acceptance by the Court over the Craig test in the near future
is doubtful, particularly in light of Westcott.
Under either type of analysis, however, it is clear that the Court has
followed its earlier trend and now requires the government, in defending
its gender classification, to articulate the purpose of the classification and
convince the Court that this is the true purpose. The Court will not, as it
will in rational basis analysis, hypothesize a state of facts that will justify
the classification. Furthermore, the Court will reject the purpose set out
by the government if it finds another to be the actual purpose and will
proceed to test this substituted purpose under the Craig test for its con-
stitutionality. Once the plaintiff has established that there is in fact a
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gender classification that triggers intermediate scrutiny, the burden is
clearly on the government to convince the Court that the articulated pur-
pose is an important interest and that the classification is, in fact, a sub-
stantially related way of dealing with the interest.
As to what will be a sufficiently important interest, the only definite
position of the Court is that old and traditional notions of the societal
roles of the respective sexes are insufficient and that administrative con-
venience alone is insufficient. The assessment of the actual purpose and
its importance may be a point of conflict between the justices, as in
Caban.
The treatment of benign or remedial purposes of gender classifications
is still unclear. It appears that the Court will not give such classifications
a lower level of scrutiny as they did in Shevin and Schlesinger. Instead, it
appears that in Orr the Court applied the Craig test's intermediate level
of scrutiny to a remedial classification and its benign purpose was only a
factor in deciding if an important state interest was being served. Thus,
benign classifications are subject to the same level of scrutiny, but have
an easier time of meeting the first prong of the Craig test. This approach
is uncertain, however, since Justice Blackmun's concurrence in Orr specif-
ically stated that the Court's opinion in no way retreated from the hold-
ing in Shevin.
Another clear result of the 1978-79 Term is that men can successfully
challenge gender classifications as a violation of the equal protection
clause. The Court discontinued its practice of invalidating statutes chal-
lenged by men on the basis that it was discriminatory as to women, as in
Weinberger and Goldfarb. Instead, the Court looked to the discrimina-
tory effect on men themselves, as in Westcott, Orr, Caban and Parham.
All of the above presupposes that the Court has found the statute to
contain a gender classification. The Court, or at least four of the Justices
led by Justice Stewart, is very demanding as to what types of classifica-
ti6ns it will find to be gender classifications. The most obvious example of
this is the refusal in Geduldig and subsequent cases to find pregnancy
classifications to be gender classifications. Although no opinion this term
clearly continued this trend, none clearly eliminated the practice. The
confusing opinion in Parham may indeed point to the Court's continuing
narrow definition of a sex classification. Perhaps continuing this tough
stance will spur Congress into action to provide corrective legislation for
these complex areas.
The Court will also be very demanding in finding a gender classification
from a disproportionate gender impact resulting from a facially neutral
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statute or practice. In its decision in Feeny this term, the Court expanded
the Washington intent requirement from race classifications to include
gender classifications. From now on, any successful constitutional chal-
lenge based on disproportionate gender impact will have to include a
showing of intent on the part of the government. The Court found the
necessary intent to exist where the government pursued a gender discrim-
inatory course of action at least in part "because of" not "in spite of" its
adverse effect on either of the sexes. This basically subjective intent re-
quirement will be difficult to fulfill and will undoubtedly limit the num-
ber of successful gender discrimination challenges based on a dispropor-
tionate gender impact theory.
Despite the active role of the Court in the sex discrimination area this
Term, uncertainty remains as to when a gender classification exists and
by what standard its constitutionality will be tested. But when a gender
classification is found, the clear position of at least a slim majority of the
Court is that such a classification cannot stand in the face of the equal
protection clause unless it is substantially related to achievement of an
important state interest. Although the rubber-stamp approval is inevita-
ble from the application of the rational basis test, and strict scrutiny al-
most always determines that the statute will be invalidated, the Craig
test is unique in equal protection challenges in that the result is not pre-
determined by the application of that particular level of scrutiny. The
Craig test is a true balance of the interests of the government on one
hand and the right of the individual to equal protection of the laws on
the other. The success or failure of either party to the controversy is more
dependent on the merits of the case and less determined by the test ap-
plied to it.
IV. CONCLUSION
In light of the Supreme Court decisions in sex discrimination cases dur-
ing the 1978-79 Term, it seems fairly certain that a victim of alleged sex
discrimination will be able to gain access to a federal court. In the area of
admission and recruitment to educational programs, provided that the
definition of federal financial assistance in Title IX is met, a private cause
of action for equitable relief is now assured. As for sex discrimination in
employment, plaintiffs whose employers are covered by Title VII are con-
fined to its remedial provisions - including the lengthy conciliation pro-
cess and limited "damages" awards. On the other hand, those whose em-
ployers are not within Title VII may be able to assert a claim based
directly on the Constitution. It must be noted, however, that such a rem-
edy is of limited scope, since the employer must be the federal govern-
ment and the plaintiff must be other than a civil service employee. The
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Court's support of the spirit of federal legislation aimed at enforcing the
constitutional guarantee of personal freedom from discrimination on the
basis of sex is very clear. Although a "day in court" is a certainty, the
likely outcome of a trial on the merits is another matter, as no guidelines
can be gleaned from the Court's opinions this Term, making lower court
opinions on the relevant issues the only sources of direction.
Approaching the area of sex discrimination from a different perspective
were the Court's decisions on the merits of equal protection challenges to
alleged gender classifications in state and federal statutes. It is clear from
these cases that strict scrutiny will not be the test applied, even if a clas-
sification is found to be based upon gender in the first place. In facially
neutral statutes, the burden upon the plaintiff to show discriminatory in-
tent is not only demanding, but also problematic. Once that burden is
met, the burden will then shift to the government to meet the Craig v.
Boren test of constitutionality. A statute will only be upheld when the
government articulates the purpose of the classification, and proves that
it is the true purpose, that it is an important purpose, and that the classi-
fication is narrowly tailored and substantially related to the achievement
of that purpose. The Craig test, unlike the other tests used by the Court
in equal protection challenges, does not predict the ultimate result. The
advantage to plaintiffs lies in the fact that while success is not assured,
neither is failure.
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